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〜 ABSTRACT 
I t i s claimed that China has completed the, demographic 
t ransi t ion. Causality t e s t s based on time series data for 1949-
1988 proves th is claim. I t i s also found that income contributes 
to the process of demographic t ransi t ion. Regression analysis 
i s done to find out the effect of the current ins t i tu t ional 
reform on the f e r t i l i t y ra te in China, as well as that of. other 
'-V . 、. 身，• 
economic factors. Inst i tut ional change regarding the economic 
reform is found to have a negative effect on the bi r th ra te . 
Contrary to the general view, there i s indirect evidence to show 
that the one-child-policy may not be so effective in resolving 
the high birth rate, in China. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN AND POPULATION POLICIES 
1.1 Introduction 
: .. .. ....  
China has experienced a constant decline in the 
mortality rate since the mid-1950s, and its mortality rates 
stabilized in the late ' 1980s. On the other hand, the 
decline in the fertility rate came after the decline in the 
mortality rate and paralleled the improvement of medical 
services. Based on these facts, it was claimed that China 
has already undergone the demographic transition (Banister 
1984,Peng 1989). Dtiring the late 1970s, China enco~ntered 
a dramatic institutional change, namely, economic reform 
and an unprecendent population policy, the one-child-
policy. Such institutional change and . policy change 
undeniably triggered different responses in fertility. The 
most common viewpoint is that one-child-policy contributed 
a lot to the recent rapid decline in the fertility rate 
decline during the late 1970s (Banister 1988, Sun and Wei 
1987, and Platte 1984/85). Another popular claim is that 
the economic reform in rural areas may dampen the effect of 
the one-child pol~cy (Dalsimer and Nisonoff 1987, Croll 
1983, and Whyte and Gu 1987). , In the first part of this 
paper, formal tests are undertaken to see whether the 
demographic transition phenomenon really happened in China. 
The second part of this paper investigates the effects of 
the current institutional change, along with other economic 
factors on fertility. It may provide indirect evidence on 
whether the one-child-policy is effective. 
2 
The successive sections of this chapter review the 
current literature on China's demography, demographic 
patte~p and population policies. 
In chapter two, causality tests are done to find out · 
the dynamic relationship between fertility and mortality to 
see whether China has completed its demographic transition. 
Furthermore, the role of income in influencing the dynamic 
relationship between fertility and mortality is -- also 
examined. Annual national data as well as annual regional 
data from 1949 to 1988 are used in the tests. 
In chapter. three, the impact of · the institutional 
change, together with other economic variables, on 
fertility (birth rate) is studied in details. Regression 
a~alyses using pooled cross-sectional time series data from 
1979 to 1987 of 29 administrative regions in China are 
employed. 
A short conclusion is presented in chapter four. 
1.2 Current Literature On China's Demography 
Before 1979, China's demographic statistics were not 
published. Because of the lack of data, there were almost 
no studies on China's demography. Starting from 1979, 
China began publishing these data. Since then research on 
China's population have been quite active. Many studies 
have been undertaken by academics from different fields, 
such as economists, sociologists and demographers. 
Some studies on general demographic 
characteristics such as its growth rate, and forecasting 
future growth, providing secondary resources for other 
3 
researchers (Banister 1984, Schran 1978, Jowett 1984, Tien 
1983). 
Another line of study concentrates on the one-child-
policy which was launched in 1979 (Chen 1985, Dalsimer and 
Nisonoff 1987, Wong Siu-lun 1984, Sun and Wei 1987, Platte 
»1984). Some of these studies examine the cross effects 
between the new agriculture policy and the one-child policy 
in China (Dalsimer and Nisonoff 1987 f Croll 1983, Wliyte and 
Gu 1987). I t i s commonly agreed that the new agriculture 
policy weakened the effectiveness of the one—child—policy 
in the rural areas. Infanticide, aging population and an 
unbalanced sex rat io are also emphasized as the 
consequences of the new population policy (Wong Siu-lun 
l?84f Banister 1988,》.Other studies considered structural 
changes to the family caused by the one—child-policy (Chen 
1985). 
The other line of research is on the correlation or 
the relationship between the bir th rate and other socio-
economic variables (Ghan 1986, Lam 1987, Tien 1983, Peng 
1989, Poston and Gu 1987) • I t i s argued that the bir th 
rate i s highly negatively correlated with the level of 
economic development. In provinces where economic 
‘ 、 
development i s more advanced, the bir th ra te 七ends to be 
lower. Despite the fact that different research have 
different indicators for the economic development, they 
reach the same conclusion. Besides, education level and 
characterist ics of married women are found to have a high 
correlation with the birth rate (Chan 1986). 
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Most of the l i terature conclude that China has 
completed the demographic transi t ion but there i s no formal 
t e s t to support th is claim. This will be done in chapter 
two of th i s paper. 
1.3 Recent Demoaraphic Trend In China 
Mortality Trend 
As seen in table 1.1, during the 1930s and the 1940s, 
the crude death rate in China was as high as 40 per 
thousand population. This was part ly explained by the 
active warfare between Japan and China, and the warfare 
between the Communist and the Nationalist armies. In the 
period of 1949 to 1950, the crude death rate was around 20 
per thousand population or above. Throughout the f i r s t 
half of the 1950s, the crude death rate remained as high as 
17 per thousand population. Many observers estimated that 
the crude death rate at that period was as high as 30 per 
2., 
thousand, which was far above the o f f i c i a l figure. The 
high death rate was understandable because af ter the 
warfare, there was land reform; production was not resumed 
quickly and the public health situaton was very poor. 
Besides, plague epidemics were widespread in the early 
1950s. Other diseases like scarlet fever, typhus and 
measles were common. Tuberculosis, diphtheria, malaria, 
kala-azar, typhoid and parasi t ic diseases were no七 yet 
cured and prevented. 
1 
for detai ls , see Banister (1987), Tien (1983) and the 
S ta t i s t ica l Yearbook of China. 
2
 see Banister (1987), p. 80. 
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Table 1.1 
Official birth rate, death rate, and 
rate of natural increase in China 
(rates per 1,000 population) 
Crude Crude Rate of 
Year Birth Rate Death Rate Natural Increase 
~ 1949 36.00 20.00 16.00 
1950 37.00 18.00 19.00 
1951 37,80 17.80 20.00 
1952 37,00 17.00 20.00 
1953 37.00 14.00 23.00 
1954 37.97 13.18 24.79 
1955 32.60 12,28 20.32 
1956 31.90 11.40 20.50 
1957 34.03 10.80 23.23 
1958 29.22 11.98 1^.24 
1959 24.78 14.59 10.19 
1960 20.86 25.43 -4.57 
1961 18.02 14.24 3.78 
1962 37.01 10.02 26.99 
1963 43,37 10.04 33.33 
1964 39.14 11.50 27.64 
,1965 37.88 9.50 28.38 
1966 35.05 8.83 26.22 
1967 33.96 8.43 25.53 
1968 35.59 8.21 27.38 
1969 34.11 8.03 26.08 
1970 33.43 7.60 25.83 
1971 30.65 7.32 23.33 
1972 29.77 7,61 22.16 
1973 27.93 7.04 20.89 
1974 24.82 7.34 17.48 
1975 23.01 7.32 15.69 
1976 19.91 7.25 12.66 
1977 18.93 6.87 12.06 
1978 18.25 6.25 12.00 
1979 17.82 6.21 11.61 
198。 18.21 6.34 11.87 
1981 20.91 6.36 14.55 
1982 21.09 6.60 14.49 
1983 18.62 7.08 11.54 
1984 17.50 6.69 10.81 
1985 17.80 6.57 11.23 
1986 20.77 6.69 14.08 
1987 21.04 6.65 14.39 
1 9
88 20.78 6.58 14.20 
20.83 6.50 14.33 
Source: Stat is t ical Yearbook 1989r s tate Sta t i s t ica l 
Bureau, 1989, p. 88. 
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In 1957, the public health campaign had reduced f i l t h 
and the number of diseases carrying pests. Epidemic 
control was in progress. Vaccination was used for 
prevention of small pox. As a resul t of these ef for t , 
death caused by infectious diseases began to decrease. In 
-1957, o f f i c i a l estimate of the crude death ra te was 10.8 
per thousand population, far below 1950's 20 per thousand. 
Since then, China's mortality began to decrease in a 
sl ightly oscil lat ing pattern. 
During the period from 1958 to 1960, the death rate 
climbed to 25.43 per thousand population in I960. This was 
due to widespread famine during 七his period. Afterwards, 
production resumed gradually and the death rate was eased 
to 10 or below in the successive years. 
From 1965 to 1976, the death ra te kept on decreasing 
to around 7 or 8 per thousand population. The pol i t ica l 
system during th i s period underwent a substantial turmoil 
because of the Cultural Revolution. The s t a t i s t i c a l 
reporting system was under serious attack during the period 
of 1966-1969. Therefore, the o f f i c i a l figure may be far 
from the t ruth. I t was believed that the actual rate was 
under-reported at th is period. 
Starting from 1969, the medical services in China 
began to have a great improvement. Barefoot doctors served 
in the rural areas, thus decreasing the death rate in the 
rural areas. Regularized access of medical services was 
made reachable to most of the populace. The death rate was 
further decreased from 8.03 in 1969 to 7.04 per thousand 
7 
population in 1973. 
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, China's death rate 
was steadily decreasing, this might be attributed to the 
constant improvement on medical services, improving living 
stardard and the stable pol i t ical environment. In spite of 
occasional natural disasters, i t was quickly confined 
locally, therefore the death rate was not affected on a 
large scale. 
On the whole, the mortality ra te decreased since the 
mid-1950s and stablized recently at around 6.5 per thousand 
population, a rather low level / compared with the levels of 
other developing countries, e . g . , 10.8 of India, 14.8 of 
Nepal/ and 20.2 of Angola; an i t i s also lower than 七he 
Jevel of some of the developed countries, e.g. 9 • 4 of 
France and 9.3 of I ta ly .
3 
Birth and Fer t i l i ty Trend 
China was for long famous for i t s high birth ra七e and 
f e r t i l i t y ra te . Traditionally, Chinese advocated large 
family, their primary goal of marriage was the bearing of 
children because having sons to continue the family name 
was a must and an honorable thing. So i t was not strange 
that Chinese like to maintain a large family and have a 
high bir th ra te . Of course, th i s phenomenon is not so 
common nowadays in China. In recent years, china has 
successfully decreased i t s birth ra te and f e r t i l i t y ra te ; 
large families are now perhaps rare rather than common. 
These figures can be found in the S ta t i s t i c Yearbook of 
China 1990 and the quoted figures are for year 1988. 
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From the of f ic ia l figures, i t was found that 
throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, China had an 
extraordinarily high crude bir th rate (except 1959, i960 
and 1961), ranging from 29.22 to 43.37 per thousand 
population (see table 1.1). These levels were high in 
一absolute terms because China's population was already about 
22% of the world's to ta l . During th i s period, although 
China was alarmed by such a high bir th ra te , not. much 
effor t was put to tackle the problem. For the years 1959 
to 1961, the rather low birth rate (18 to 24 per thousand) 
was due to the great famine of that period. 
In 1963, af ter the famine, the bir th ra te h i t i t s peak 
since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, 
at 43 per thousand population. 
Since 1970, birth control based on the slogan "wan, 
xi, shao" (later marriage, mid-20s for women, la te 20s for 
men; longer intervals between bir ths , three to four years; 
fewer children—no more than two per family in c i t i e s and 
three in rural areas) was implemented. This represented 
the government's declared effor t tackling the problem of 
high bir th ra te . From this time onwards, the bir th rate 
began to f a l l . 
For the whole of the 1970s, the bir th ra te declined 
from 33.43 in 1970 to 17.82 per thousand population in 
1979. During the period of 1980 to 1982,七he bir th rate 
rose a l i t t l e b i t . During th is period, shortly af ter the 
implementation of the one-child-policy, people might have 
hurried with their birth plans as they feared that the 
9 
policy might get s t r ic te r over time, thereby pushing up the 
birth ra te . During the years 1983 to 1985, the crude 
birth rate f e l l sl ightly. This can be attributed to the 
coercive manner the Chinese government was pursuing the 
one-child-policy. However, in 七he following years,七he 
-b i r th rate had a rather unstable pattern. I t increased to 
20.77 in 1986 and to 21.04 per thousand population in 1987 
and then f e l l somewhat afterwards. 
By and large, during the 1970s and the 1980s,七here 
was a downward trend in the birth ra te . Many demographers 
attributed th is to the effectiveness of the bir th policy in 
Ghina (Tien 1983, Banister 1984)• Meanwhile, the effects 
of the r is ing education levels and the change in at t i tude 
towards bearing children on the bir th rate cannot be 
neglected. 
Many observers speculated that China's bir th rates 
were under-reported.
4
 In viewing th i s and in hope of 
getting more accurate data for future use, in Sep七ember 
1982, the State Family Planning Committee carried out a 
nationwide f e r t i l i t y survey. The sample population was 
over 1 million persons. This large sample provided more 
rel iable information on f e r t i l i t y behaviour. A closer look 
at China's f e r t i l i t y based on th is informa七ion may give us 
a clearer picture on China's demography. 
Referring to table 1.2, before 1949,七he to ta l 
4
 Banister (1987), p. 229. 
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Table 1.2 
Total f e r t i l i t y rates in China, 1940-1981 
Total Total 
Year Fer t i l i ty Rate Year Fer t i l i ty Rate 
1940 5.251 1961 3.287 
1941 5.317 1962 6.023 
1942 5.001 1963 7.502 
1943 5.300 1964 ^6.176 
1944 5.187 1965 6.076 
1945 5.295 1966 6.259 
1946 5.514 1967 5.313 
1947 5.840 1968 6.448 
1948 5.509 1969 5.723 
1949 6.139 1970 5.812 
1950 5.813 1971 5.442 
1951 5.699 1972 4.984 
1952 6.472 1973 4.539 
1953 6.049 1974 4.170 
1954 6.278 1975 3.571 
1955 6.261 1976 3.235 
19
56 5.854 1977 2.844 
1957 6.405 1978 2.716 
1958 5.679 1979 2.745 
1959 4.303 1980 2.238 
4.015 1981 2.631 
Source:Chen Shengli, "Fert i l i ty of Women During the 42-Year 
Period From 1940 to 1981", in China Population 
Information Centre, Analysis On China's National 
One-per-Thousand-Population Fer t i l i ty Sampling 
Survey, Beijing (1984), pp. 56-57. 
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f e r t i l t i t y rate
5
 was around 5.5 per woman. The f e r t i l i t y 
rate began to r i se in the late 1940s. During the years 
1952 to 1957, the f e r t i l i t y rate was as high as 6 births 
per woman. This was partly explained by the afterwar baby 
boom. Another factor contributing to the high f e r t i l i t y 
—rate was the land reform,' Landless peasants and tenants 
were redistributed land in the land reform campaign. For 
the sake of more farm laborers, peasant demanded、more 
children. 
During the period of 1958 to 1961, the f e r t i l i t y rate 
dropped sl ight ly owing to the famine in that period. 
Afterwards, i t reached the peak of 7.5 per woman in 1963. 
This was not surpris because i t could be explained by the 
post-famine baby boom. For the whole of the 1960s, china 
s t i l l experienced a high f e r t i l i t y ra te of around 6 per 
woman• 
After 1970, the f e r t i l i t y ra te began to f a l l 
constantly. Total f e r t i l i t y rate dropped from 5.812 per 
woman in 1970 to 2.631 in 1981. This change was rather 
large. 
In short, f e r t i l i t y decline took place in 七he 1970s, 
but the scale of decline was remarkable. 
The behaviour of the crude bir th rate and the to ta l 
f e r t i l i t y rate were quite similiar, e .g . , both had i t s peak 
in 1963, and exhibi七ed a declining trend beginning in the 
Total f e r t i l t i t y rate (TFR) is defined as the average 
number of children who would be born alive to a woman 
during her lifetime if she lived through a l l her 




During the 1950s, the mortality rate and the birth 
rate were high, leading to a moderate population growth at 
around 20 per thousand population (for the population trend 
„ see 七able 1.1) . In the 1960s, the mortali七y rate f e l l 
considerably due to the advancement in medical services, 
however, the bir th rate was s t i l l high. The resul t was a 
rather high population growth ra te . In 1963, the 
population growth was at i t s peak of 33.33 per thousand 
population. During the early 1970s, the mortality rate 
remained low and the birth rate began to s l ide, resulting 
in a s l ight decline in the population growth rate . 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the bir th ra te dropped 
speedily and the population growth rate began to f a l l at 
around 12 per thousand population. In the 1980s, the death 
rate and the birth rate were rather low. The population 
growth ra te exhibited a pattern of ups and downs at a low 
level of 10 to 14 per thousand popula七ion. 
From the above discussion, we know that the history of 
China's demographic pattern since the 1940s was quite 
similar to that of western countries. Mortality dropped 
f i r s t , then came the decline in bir ths . Finally, both 
rates decreased to a low level, result ing in a low 
population growth rate. 
1.4 Policies For Controlling Birth 
Although China is famous for i t s bir th control policy, 
i t has in fact another device for coping with the 
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population problem and that is the marriage law. 
The Marriage Law 
The f i r s t attempt by the People's Republic to regulate 
marriage was the Marriage Law of 1950.
6
 This law set the 
minimum age for marriage at 18 and 2 0 for women and men, 
—respectively. Although in th is period, China's bir th rate 
was as high as 36 to 38 per thousand population (see table 
1 • 1) / th i s law did not aim at decreasing f e r t i l i t y as the 
o f f i c ia l s were not aware of the seriousness of the 
population growth problem. This law was, in fact , aimed at 
getting r id of the old conventions of early and arranged 
marriages. 
The issue of late marriage was raised again in 1956. 
China began to perceive her unusually high population 
growth as a hindrance to economic development (Aird 1972)• 
However, opinion among off ic ia ls were divided on the issue 
and the marriage law was not tightened. 
In 1962, a f te r the Great Leap Forward^ the of f ic ia l s 
paid more attention towards the problem of high population 
growth. The issue of late marriage reappeared. Although 
the early marriage law was not amended, youth were educated 
and encouraged to marry unti l well past the legal minimum 
age. 
Throughout 七he 1970s, the marriage law remained 
unchanged. However, the government began to delay 
marriages by other devices: introducing l e t t e r s of 
The information on marriage law i s based on Tien (1983) 
pp. 90-107. “ 
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introduction, permissions to marry and other credentials. 
Meanwhile, local i t ies used such documents as a means to 
achieve thei r target average minimum marriage age. 
Permission was frequently not granted to youths who applied 
for marriage unt i l they were older. 
During the 1970s, population control in China was 
furthered promoted with the slogan "wan, x i , shao' ( later , 
longer, fewer) • The late marriage rate emerged as an 
indicator of performance of local bir th control practice. 
Locali七ies t r ied to achieve a high average age of f i r s t 
marriage as far as possible. 
Since the imposition of the marriage law in 1950, the 
o f f ic ia l report showed that the average age a 七 f i r s 七 
marriage was gradually increasing from 18.7 to 22.8 (refer 
to table 1.3). The performance of the urban areas were 
constantly better than that of the rural areas (table 1.3). 
I t was understandable because in the urban areas, less 
resistance was experienced, while in some rural areas the 
subterfuge of Chinese age reckoning was allowed. 
From the of f ic ia l figure, i t seemed that the o f f i c ia l 
marriage age constraint had achieved a continuous success 
since the average age of f i r s t marriage was fa l l ing , i f we 
ignore the increasing education level and other social 
changes that were also causing people to postpone their age 
of marriage. In 1980 the new marriage law was changed and 
the minimum marriage age was set at 20 for women and 22 for 
men. Compared wi七h the old marriage law, these levels were 
only two years higher. 
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Table 1.3 
Women's Average Age at First 
Marriage in Urban and Rural Areas 
of China, 1950-81 
year Urban Rural National 
1950 19.7 18.5 18.7 
1951 19.7 18.5 18.7 
1952 20.1 18.7 19.0 
1953 20.2 18.7 19.0 
1954 20.4 18.8 19.1 
1955 20.5 18.8 19.1 
1956 20.7 18.8 19.2^ 
1957 20.5 18.9 19.2 
1958 20.7 18.8 19.1 
1959 20.7 19.0 19.3 
1960 21.1 19.3 19.6 
1961 21.2 19.4 19.7 
1962 21.2 19.3 19.6 
1963 21.1 19.3 19.5 
1964 21.7 19.2 19.5 
1965 22.1 19.3 19.7 
1966 22.5 19.4 19.4 
1967 22.5 19.5 19.5 
1968 22.4 19.7 19.7 
1969 22.4 20.0 20.0 
1970 22.3 19.9 19.9 
1971 22.8 19.9 19.9 
1972 23.3 20.3 20.3 
1973 23.6 20.6 20.6 
1974 23.9 20.9 20.9 
1975 24.3 21.3 21.3 
1976 24.7 21.8 21.8 
1977 25.1 22.0 22.0 
1978 25.2 22.3 22.3 
1979 25.5 22.6 22.6 
1980 25.3 22.5 22.5 
二一 24.8 22,3 22.3 
Source: Judith Banister, China's Changing 
Populationr Stanford University Press, 1987, 
p. 156, table 6.1. 
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With reference to the ever-increasing ef for t to curb 
the population growth, i t was surprising that the minimum 
marriage age had not been adjusted to an even higher level 
in spite of i t s claimed performance. Why were the new ages 
not set at 23 and 25 for women and men respectively or even 
.higher? I七 may be due to the problem of feas ib i l i ty . 
Although for long, the reported figures said that the 
average age of f i r s t marriage was increasing and fair above 
the level set in the f i r s t marriage law, i t would not be 
surprising if in effect the actual figures were much lower. 
Localities often under-reported the true f igures .工n other 
cases, youth began their married l ives by ignoring or 
delaying registrat ion. Therefore, i t was understandable 
that the government set a less stringent requirement. This 
might be deemed as a compromise between the need to curb 
f e r t i l i t y and the social r ea l i t i e s and the y o u t h s d e s i r e 
to get married at an early age* 
The Birth Policy 
Another means to curb the population growth in China 
was the birth policy. Since the 1950s, China had 
unprecedentedly high rates of population growth (about 
24%) • The government t r ied to corrtrol the f e r t i l i t y by 
te l l ing people to limit their f e r t i l i t y voluntarily. Of 
course, th i s a七temp七 was in vain. During 七he period of 
1955—58, mass distribution of contraceptives including 
diaphragms, unlubricated condoms, contraceptive j e l l i e s and 
foams began. Intra-uterine devices were supplied in a few 
7
 Banister (1987), p. 267, table 8.11. 
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c i t i e s . I t was not surprising that contraceptive use in 
the 1950s was not common because contraceptives were poor 
in quality and in supply. Moreover, the demand for bir th 
control at that time was not deemed as impelling. 
By 1958, China had made the supply of contraceptives 
.much 
moir© available• Yet, success wa.s not accompanied with 
th is e f for t because of the problem with social acceptance. 
After the Great Leap Forward, the government furthered i t s 
ef for t to slow down the f e r t i l i t y ra te . In addition to 
encouraging late marriage, the ideal of a two-child family 
was promoted. To fac i l i t a t e th is promotion, intra-uterine 
contraceptive devices, vasectomy and abortion were 
encouraged and made available. In 1963, a huge effor t to 
raise the quanti七y and quality of contraceptive devices was 
forwarded and since then, supply problems became less 
popular. Research on abortion, s t e r i l i za t ion and 
contraceptive p i l l s were continued. 
In 1964, the f i r s t national Family Planning Office was 
set up. Some provinces set up the i r own committee to 
coordinate their propaganda work. During 1962-66, rapid 
f e r t i l i t y decline was reported in many c i t i e s , and rural 
resis七ance to f e r t i l i t y control was also softened. In 七he 
1970s, in order to further lower the f e r t i l i t y ra te , the 
introduction of family planning programs was deemed as 
urgent. The government t r ied to require urban couples to 
stop at two living children and rural couples to stop a七 
three. These requirements were not compulsory at that 
time. In 1977, the government switched the policy from a 
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voluntary stage to a compulsory stage. Rural and urban 
couples had to stop at two. Abortion and s te r i l i za t ion 
became ^ popular measures• 
Despite the constant effor t to curb population growth 
since the 1950s, the government wanted to further decrease 
-the natural rate from 1.21 in 1977 to 1 per thousand 
population by 1980 (Banister 1984). The government decided 
to implement a new birth policy or bet ter say a s t r i c t e r 
bir th policy, the one-chiId-policy. This new policy was 
announced in January 1979. The i n i t i a l goal of th i s policy 
was that 20% of urban couples and 5% of rural couples 
stopped at one child. 
During 1979, the government quickly changed i t s 
a t t i tude from encouragement of the one-child family to 
insistence that a l l couples should follow the one-child-
policy. The corresponding incentive and disincentive 
scheme were implemented in most provinces except in areas 
where minorities inhabitated. In c i t i e s and towns, monthly 
cash payment, housing allocation, job assignments, free 
medical care for the child, free schooling and pr ior i ty for 
enrolment in kindergarten and preferred schools were given 
to couples who signed a pledge to declare that 七hey would 
cease childbearing when they had a child. In rural areas, 
couples were granted with more work points. On the other 
hand, the bir th of a third or higher order child would be 
accompanied with economic penalties. In urban areas, 
salar ies were reduced; medical care and schooling benefits 
would not be given to extra children. In rural areas, work 
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points would be deducted. 
By 1981, most provinces t r ied to prevent the second 
birth. A second child was not of f ic ia l ly permitted, except 
in rare cases. This practice was also implemented even in 
rural areas where the birth policy was usually implemented 
—in a more lenient way. Since the implementation of the 
policy, i t was claimed that i t had attained considerable 
achievements (Sun and Wei 1987) . From 1949 to 1979, the 
average natural population growth was about 25 while in 
1985, i t was 10.81 per thousand population. 
However, despite i t s claimed performance, other 
serious consequences could not be denied. Female 
infanticide became serious after the implementation of the 
one-child-policy (New Statesman 1986)• Traditionally, 
Chinese families had a preference towards male offsprings 
rather than female ones. If families were only allowed to 
have one child,七hey would prefer a son. Hence, if the 
firs七 child was female, some families xaigh七 k i l l their baby 
immediately af ter her birth and hope to bear another baby 
son la ter on. This was extraordinarily common especially 
in rural areas where manpower was an important asset to the 
family. This phenomenon became even worse since the 
introduction of the responsibility agricultural system 
after 1978. This new agricultural system emphasized 七he 
importance of production at family level; families were 
awarded according to their production achievements, hence 
manpower became more important than under the collective 
agricultural system in which people were granted according 
f香港中文大學國書館 
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to the production level of the whole production team. As 
a resul t of female infanticide, there was an unbalanced sex 
ra t io . The policy would also a l t e r other demographic 
characterist ics of the population. Aging population would 
be expected in the next several decades. Hence the one-
child-policy i s not without cost. Some studies reveal 
that th i s policy has not been tightened in recent years 
(Zeng 1989). This may re f lec t the government's 
understanding on the negative aspects of th i s policy. The 
future evolution of th is policy will probably depend on how 
much pressure the problem of population growth will bring 
to bear on the Chinese government. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
.、*。 
I t has always been said that China had already 
undergone the demographic transi t ion despite i t s rather low 
JLevel of development. Many scholars a t t r ibute th is to 
China's effective birth policy. Whether the bir th policy 
i s effective i s hard to t e s t direct ly and will not be 
discussed here. The aim of 七 his chapter i s to 七 est 
rigorously whether the phenomenon of demographic transi t ion 
real ly happened in China. Granger-causality t e s t s are 
employed to find out the causal relationship between 
f e r t i l i t y and mortality. Besides, the role of income in 
influencing th i s relationship is also studied. Data used 
here i s the time series of 1949-1988. National as well as 
regional data are used in the tests• 
2.1 Explanations Of Demographic Transition 
Demographic transit ion describes the process when a 
population changes from high f e r t i l i t y ra te (birth rate) 
and high mortality rate to low f e r t i l i t y ra te (birth rate) 
and low mortality rate. This phenomenon occurred 
his tor ica l ly in many western countries especially in 
western Europe but i s less common in developing countries. 
For years, the relationships between mortality and 
f e r t i l i t y have been an active research topic. This interest 
has lead to a 七 tempts to create a theory which links 
together a l l the elements of population change. 
A fu l l formulation of the demographic t ransi t ion was 
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suggested by Frank Notestein in 1945 (Allan and Anne 
Findlay 1987). His formulation was based on his 
observations on the changes in the f e r t i l i t y and mortality 
rates of west European countries. This resulted from the 
agricultural , industrial and sanitary revolutions which 
-these societies had experienced in the eighteenth and 
• g 
nineteenth centuries. His claim suggested that a 
t ransi t ion took place in mortality and f e r t i l i t y ra七es from 
high to low. Before the latter* stage i s reached, there i s 
a t ransi t ional phase of declining mortality ra tes and high 
f e r t i l i t y ra te . After th is / f e r t i l i t y ra tes decline 
because social and economic condi七ions are improved and 
f e r t i l i t y control replaces regimes of natural control. 
In short Notestein interpreted demographic t ransi t ion 
as a response to the processes of mocierniza七ion. Mortality 
decline occurs along wi七h an increase in industr ial izat ion 
and urbanization, a diffusion of medical technology and 
r i se in l i teracy and living standards. With some time lag, 
the reduction in mortality rate t r iggers a subsequent f a l l 
in f e r t i l i t y ra te . 
The pursuit of an explanation on the positive 
association between f e r t i l i t y and mortality can be traced 
back to Mai thus. In Malthusian theory, a r i se in real 
wages above a subsistence level reduces the average age of 
marriage and increases f e r t i l i t y ra te , which i s expected to 




Allan and Anne Findlay (1987), p.29. 
9
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general, high f e r t i l i t y rates are responsible for high r isk 
bir ths, thus increasing mortality. 
The positive relationship between f e r t i l i t y and 
mortality can also be attributed to biological supply-
effects . The positive association between length of post-
partum amenorrhea and the duration of breast feeding are 
the biological causal effects of a decline in infant 
mortality that reduces f e r t i l i t y . The prolonged lactation 
due to the reduction in infant mortality has ^n important 
f e r t i l i t y reducing effect .
1 0
 Lower infant mortality rates 
in turn means lower overall mortality ra tes . 
Modern economic theory views the relationship between 
f e r t i l i t y and mortality from the demand side of parents 
(Becker, 1960).
11
 A couple's choice of f ina l consumption 
during the i r married l i f e i s limited by the i r time and 
nonhuman capital resources. The couple choose thei r 
consumption of market goods and services, leisure, and 
children according to relat ive prices and to t a l income. As 
bearing and rearing of children require a lo t of time 
especially mother's time and market income, i t i s 
reasonable to conjecture that market wages/ non-human 
wealth and market prices influence the parents ' demand for 
children. 
If the parents are concerned only with the number of 
surviving children, infant and child mortality exert two 




for deta i l s , see Paul Schultz (1976). 
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mortality increases the number of surviving children by 
decreasing the expected cost to parents of bearing and 
rearing enough offspring to obtain a survivor• This i s the 
price ef fec t . On the other hand i t decreases 七he derived 
demand for births for a fixed number surviving children by 
—decreasing the number of births required to obtain a 
survivor. The price effect increases while the l a t t e r 
supply effect decreases parents
f
 demand for children. If 
demand for surviving children is price ine las t ic , then a 
decrease in child mortality leads to a decrease in 七he 
demand for children, thus decreasing the f e r t i l i t y ra te . 
Demographic transit ion emphasizes that decline in 
mortality triggers subsequent f e r t i l i t y decline. 
Therefore, in order to see whether the demographic 
t ransi t ion had occured in China, i t i s relevant to t e s t the 
causal relationship between mortality and fe r t i l i t y* To 
observe th i s dynamic relationship, the Granger-causality 
t e s t s are employed. 
2•2 Granger-causality 
The definit ion of Granger-causality i s as follows 
(Granger 1969): 
Given: X and Y are two stationary stochastic processes 
or white noises. 
L e t :
 X and Y be the sets of past values of X and 
Y, respectively. 
¢7 (X|G) is the minimum predictive error of X 
given a set of information G. 
The causality relationship i s defined as: 
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1- Y causes X or there exists a unidirectional 
relationship running from Y to X, i f X can be 
predicted better by using both the past values of 
X and Y than by using the past values of X alone. 





concept of Y causes X can be defined in the same 
way. 
2. Y causes X and X also causes Y or there exists a 
bidirectional relationship between X and Y if 
cj2(X|X,Y) < cr2(X|X) and a2(Y|X,Y) < a2(Y|Y). 
There are different ways to do the causality t e s t , 
e.g. Sim's (1972), Granger (1969), Pierce and Haugh (1977), 
and Hsiao (1978a, 1979). 工 will employ the time series 
techniques developed by Granger (1969) for i t s wide 
acceptance and convenience. 
Using Granger's Direct Test, the linear predictors of 












 ^ •….(2.2) 
J=1 J=1 
where e l t and e2t are white noises. 
The hypothesis 七ha七 Y causes X can be examined by 
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test ing the joint significance of the lagged coefficients 
of Y in equation (2.1) . If a l l the CjS are signif icantly 
different from zero, then Y causes X. The causal 
relationship of X on Y can be defined similiarly by test ing 
the coefficients gjS in equation (2.2). The methods 
mentioned above are designed to t e s t the causal pattern 
for a bivariate case. Hence (2.1) and (2.2) wil l be used 
to examine the causal relationship between mortality and 
f e r t i l i t y . 
However, i t i s believed that economic growth may 
contribute to the process of population t ransi t ion, 
therefore, the bivariate model may suffer from serious 
specification error when test ing the causal relationship 
between mortality and f e r t i l i t y . One of the methods to 
al leviate the problem is to use t r iva r i a t e models on top of 
the bivariate models. The t r iva r i a t e model i s defined as 
(Granger 1969): 
Let Z be the third stationary stochastic process and 
Z be the set of past values of Z. Causality conditional on 
the presence of Z can be defined as (Granger 1969): 
1. Y causes X in the presence of Z if X can be 
predicted better by X and Y than by X alone both 
being conditional on the presence of Z in both 
cases. In the other words, Y causes X in the 





causation from X to Y can also be defined in a 
similiar way. 
2
- There exists a bidirectional relationship between 
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X and Y conditional on the presence of Z if 




Again, the linear predictors become: 
k m n 
W l d j Z ^ e ^ . … • • (2.3) 
J=1 J=1 J=1 




 J2 (2.4) 
J=l j=l j=l 
， ， . . . ‘ 
Y causes X in the presence of Z if a l l c}s are s ig-
nifican七ly different from zero. On the other hand, x 
causes Y in the presence of Z if a l l g，are signif icantly 
different from zero. 
2.3 Test Specification 
Specifically, I t ry to tes t two issues related 七o 七he 
demogrpahic transi t ion: 
(1) The causal relationship between bir th and death. 
(2) The role of income changes in the causal 
relationship between bir th and death. 
I wanted to investigate the causal relationship 
between f e r t i l i t y and death, however, due to data 
insufficiency 工 had to use the bir th rate in my t e s t s . I t 
i s
 believed 七hat the birth rate bears a strong positive 
relationship with the f e r t i l t i y ra te . 
The firs七 issue can be found by tes t ing whether bir th 
causes death and whether death causes b i r th . The second 
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issue can be found by testing whether income can change the 
causal relationship between death and bir th . To study the 
above relationships, the following four equations will be 
estimated: 
Bivariate models 












^it ' (2 .5) 
P q 
D，f+ J2 £ 一广2t. .... . (2.6) ；  
Trivariate models 




T / d jY^e^…….(2 .7 ) 
J=1 J=1 J=1 — 
P q r 
Dt=f+E 缺 i J Y t - j + e 2 t ' •…• (2.8) 
J=1 J=1 J=1 
where B i s crude birth rate. 
D i s crude death rate . 
Y i s per capita income in log form. 
e1t and e2t are white noises. 
Equa 七 ion (2.5) is used to find out whether death 
causes bir th while (2.6) i s for test ing the reverse 
causality. These two equations are tested because I want 
七 o find out 七 he direction of 七 he causal relationship 
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between bir th and death. Equations (2.7) and (2.8) are 
used to find out the causal relationship between bir th and 
death with the presence of income. With these four 
equations, the f i r s t statement can be tested. 
Furthermore, equations (2.7) and (2.8) can also used 
to t e s t 七he second statement. If the causal relationship 
between bir th and death obtained from equation (2.5) and 
(2.6) i s different from that of equation (2.7) and (2.8) 
income i s said to change the causal pattern between birth 
and death. We can also investigate whether income causes 
bir th and death respectively with the t r iva r i a t e models. 
2•4 Data Specification 
In my t e s t , there are three variables, namely, the 
crude death rate , the crude bir th ra te and per capita 
income which are a l l annual data. Data for per capita 
income are a l l in real values (1952 as base year) and are 
in log form. 
National data and regional data are used in the 
estimation. This can enhance the robustness of the t e s t 
resul ts • For t e s t s regarding the bir th irate and 七he death 
rate only, data of twenty-nine regions are used. For the 
t e s t s involving the birth rate , the death ra te and income, 
data of 七 wenty — eight regions are used (omitting Tibet 
because of 七he lack of income data). The data series are 
not of the same length. Most of them star七 in 1949 and end 
in 1988. 
2•5 Test Procedure 
The basic assumption in Granger-causality i s that a l l 
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the variables must be stationary stochastic processes. This 
i s not so common for many economic time-series exhibit 
linear or quadratic trends or other character is t ics . In 
order to make sure that the three variables of concern meet 
th i s cr i ter ion, the Dickey-Fuller Test i s employed at the 
—very beginning stage. 
In employing the Dickey-Fuller Test, we must know the 
autoregressive order of a l l the data ser ies . Akaike's 
information cri ter ion (AIC)
13
 i s used as a cr i ter ion to 
select the AR order for a l l the data ser ies . I t i s found 
out that a l l the series have an AR order of 1 to 3 •仏 In 
order to have a more accurate resul t , subsequent t e s t s are 
based on the assumption that a l l data series are of AR 
order 1 to 工n other words, t e s t s wil l be done according 
to three sets of equations in which the variables are 
assumed to be AR1, AR2 and AR3 respectively. 
The resul ts of the Dickey-Fuller Test for 七he 七hiree 
variables before f i l t e r ing strongly reveal that these data 
series are non-stationary (refer to tables 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 
2.1.3). To obtain a stationary time series , f i l t e r i ng i s 
necessary. 
12 
For deta i ls of the Dickey-Fuller Test, see Fuller 1976. 
1985. 
13
 Assuming a Gaussian process, Akaike's information 
cr i ter ion of an autoregressive process in order k i s 
defined as follows: AIC(k) = lna^ + 2k/T where T i s the 
number of observations of the ser ies . For deta i l s , see 
Judge et a l . 1985. p.245. 
11 
The resul ts on the AR order are s t raight forward and 
are not presented for simplicity. 
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Table 2.1.1 Dickey-Puller Test for Crude Birth Rate 
Variable: br 
Region • Name t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -1.01 -1.04 -1.11 -1.55 -2.00 -1.56 
Anhui -0.88 -0.75 -0.59 -2.66 -2.44 -2.06 
Beijing -1.28 -1.30 -1.26 -1.23 -1.34 -0.97 
Fujian -0.82 -0.82 -0.88 -2.04 -1.76 -1.10 
Gansu -0.79 -0.88 -0.85 -1.62 -1.90 -1.93 
Guangdong -1.06 -1.12 -1.06 -2.05 -2.35 -1.79 
Guangxi -1.07 -0.84 -0.85 -1.66 一 1 . 9 9 -1.19 
Guizhou -0.62 -0,71 -0.68 -1.66 -2.07 —1.85 
Hebei -0.74 -0.47 -0.75 -2.09 -2.50 -2.04 
Heilongjiang -1.72 -1.55 -1.13 -1.37 -1.20 -0.78 
Henan -1.15 -0.93 -1.29 -1.88 -2.20 -1.21 
Hubei -0.87 -0.63 -0.69 -1.90 -2.11 -1.32 
Hunan -0.99 -0.99 -0.97 -2.13 -2.31 产1/95 
Jiangsu -1.20 -1.24 -1.27 -1.20 -1.71 -1.47 
Jiangxi -0.86 -0.86 -0.72 -1.45 -1.15 -0.98 
J i l i n -0.87 -1.29 -1,29 -1.13 -1.11 -1.12 
Liaoning - 1 . 6 1 -1.42 -1.34 -2.19 - l .85 一 1 . 3 4 
Nei Mongol -2.22 -1.19 -1.08 -3.56* -1.62 -0!86 
Ningxia -1.02 -1.12 -1.2 6 -1.95 -2.32 -2.08 
Qinghai ^1.22 -0.94 -0.62 -1.81 ，2•19 -1.61 
Shaanxi -1.2 0 -0.98 -0.87 -1.33 -0.93 >0.73 
Shandong -0.84 -0.83 -0.88 -1.69 -1.70 -1.70 
Shanghai -0.88 -1:92 -1.66 -1.32 -1.64 -1.30 
Shanxi -0.46 -0.60 -0.76 -1.93 -1.51 -1.40 
Sichuan -0.85 -1.07 -0.89 -1.38 -2.27 -1!55 
Tianjin -1.22 -1.24 -1.29 -1.63 -1.68 -1:20 
Tibet 0.42 0.42 0.36 -2.61 -2.78 -2.51 
Xinjiang -0.73 -0,67 -0.66 -0.73 -1.20 -1.17 
Yunnan -0.69 -0.71 -0.71 -2.23 -2.20 -2.12 
Zhejiang -1.03 -1.10 -1.05 -1.26 -1.44 -1.15 
Note:br=crude birth rate 
t l - t一value of 七he estimated coefficient assuming AR 
cprder=l and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
tml - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
* Stationary at 5% error 
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Table 2.1.2 Dickey-Fuller Test for Crude Death Rate 
Variable: dr 
region JJame t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -1.74 -1.59 -1.72 -2.62 -2.35 -2.20 
Anhui -3.36* -2.13* -1.64 -5.08* -3.51* -2.88 
Beijing -2.11* -3.05* -1.40 -3.09* -4.90* -2.37 
Fujian -1.61 -1.83 -1.81 -2.49 -2.97* -2,63 
Gansu -1.89 -1.25 -1.13 -3.74* -2.38 -2,17 
Guangdong -1.81 -0.16 -1.92 -2.08 -1.92 -2.15 
Guangxi -1.45 -1.47 -1.19 -2.07 -2.42 -1.37 
Guizhou -1.68 -1.42 -1.08 -3.38* -2.92 -1.97 
Hebei -1.26 -1.29 -1.52 -1.81 -1.49 -1.10 
Heilongj iang-1.51 -2.09* -1.93 -1.65 -1.46 -1.22 
Henan -2.02* -1.39 -1.21 -4.02* -2.76 -2.12 
Hubei -1.51 -1.09 -1.04 -3.72* -2.98* -2.16 
Hunan -1.60 -1.52 -1.58 -2.74 -2.53 -,2.17 
Jiangsu -1.01 -1.42 -1.04 -1.67 -2.86 -1.75 
J iangxi -1.58 -2.33* -1.75 -1.85 -2.57 -1.52 
J i l i n -1.45 -1.77 -1.76 -2.08 -1.53 -1.35 
Liaoning -1,10 -1.02 -0.75 -2.53 一 1 . 6 7 -1.38 
Nei Mongol -3.09* -1.43 _1.39 -6.69* -2.72 -1.29 
Ningxia -2.27* -1.94 >3.27* -2.16 -2.16 -3.50 
Qinghai -2.07* -1.69 —1.22 -3.80* -3.18* -2.33 
Shaanxi -0.96 -0.91 -0.85 -1.67 -1.47 -1.07 
Shandong -1.03 -1.09 -0.99 -1.42 -2.01 -1.12 
Shanghai -0-85 -2.78* -0.67 -3.03* -7.27* -3.06* 
Shanxi -1.38 -1.65 -1.80 -1.48 -1.17 -0.92 
Sichuan -1.26 -2.06* -1.03 -1.94 -3.62* -1.78 
Tianjin -1.43 -1.94 -1.64 -2.48 -2.70 -2.23 
Tibet -0.25 -0.12 -0.57 -5.25* -1.70 -1.47 
Xinjiang -1.93 -2.05* -2.43 -2.11 -1.98 -2.00 
Yunnan -1.37 -0.96 -0.87 -2.56 -1.50 -1.26 
Zhej iang -2.22* -2,41* -2.01 -2.25 -2.76 -2.13 
Note:dr=crude death rate 
t l - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
tml - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
* stationary at 5% error 
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Table 2.1.3 Dickey-Fuller Test for Income 
Variable: logpni 
region Name t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -2.98* -1.85 -2.35* 0.38 0.14 0.50 
Anhui -1.85 -1.10 1.68 0.55 0.63 0.35 
Beijing -1.30 -1.82 -1.83 -1.33 -1.78 -1.78 
Fujian -2.43* -1.55 -3.37* 0.26 -0.13 0.82 
Gansu -1.53 -1.29 -1.28 -0.60 -1.00 -0.42 
Guangdong -3.51* -2.16* -2.03* 0.56 0.62 1.15 
Guangxi -2.69* -1.94 -1.71 0.14 -0.16 0.07 
Guizhou -1.79 -1.38 -1.32 -0.57 -1.19 -0.62 
Hebei -2.85* -1.64 -1.98* -0.24 -0.35 —0.11 
Heilongjiang -0.11 -1.14 -1.20 -1.38 一 1 . 0 0 -0.79 
Henan -2.50* -1.71 -1.58 -0.58 -0.63 0.0001 
Hubei -2.20* -1.80 -2.03* 0.17 0.22 -0.41 
Hunan -2.96* -2.20* -1.81 -0.92 -0.71 -0.54 
Jiangsu -3 . 31* -1. 93 -1.97* 2 . 36* 1.65 ,:1.79 
Jiangxi -3.35* -2_28* -1.86 -0.51 一 0 . 4 6 0.15 
J i l i n -1.94 -1.65 -1.94 0.17 -0.10 0.48 
Liaoning -1.92 -1.41 -1.57 -0.92 - 0 . 9 6 -0.81 
Nei Mongol -1,40 -1.27 —1.22 -0.77 -0.67 -0.21 
Ningxia -0.08 0.14 0.23 -0.36 -0.12 0.09 
Qinghai 0.78 0.24 0.53 -1.10 -1.17 -1.06 
Shaanxi -2.25* -1.88 -2.10* -0,78 -0.97 -0.73 
Shandng -2.50* -2.59* —1.87 -0.68 0.14 0.16 
Shanghai -2.25* -1.52 -1,77 -0.54 -0.21 -0.29 
Shanxi -2.69* -1.88 -1.96* -0.82 -0.99 -0.57 
Sichuan -2.17* -1.79 -1.83 -0.09 -0.46 -0.06 
Tianjin -1.20 -0.95 -0.97 -2.21 -1.97 -1.96 
Tibet N.A. N.A. N.A. N,A. N.A. N.A. 
Xinjiang -2.85* -2.05* -1.77 -0.62 -0.73 -0.67 
Yunnan -2.91* -2.33* -2.42* -0.15 -0.30 -0.05 
Zhejiang -3.92* -1.94 -1.86 0.89 0.18 0.81 
Note: logpni==log per capita income 
t l - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming Ar 
order=3 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
tml 一 t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
* stationary at 5% error 
N.A. not applicable due to lacking in data 
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Sims (1972) suggested differencing the raw data by a 
linear f i l t e r of the form (1-0.75B)
2
 where B is the lag 
operator. Other f i l t e r s e.g. (1-pB)
2
 developed by Mehra and 
Spencer (1978) and (l-^B) (l-/n2B) • • • (l-/nkB) by Kawai (1980) 
are designed to achieve a stationary series . One of the 
一most common f i l t e r s i s (1-B), that means to take the f i r s t 
difference of the raw data. I use th i s f i l t e r because of 
i t s general acceptance and convenience. 
The Dickey Fuller Test i s again employed to t e s t the 
data a f te r f i r s t differencing to make sure the stationary 
time series are obtained. The t e s t resul ts are shown in 
tables 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3. The bir th rate exhibits a 
pattern of s ta t ionari ty for a l l regional data series and 
national data ser ies . However, the t e s t resul ts indicate 
that the death rate and per capita real income are not 
stationary for several regions cannot be rejected. 
Given that removing non-stationarity i s a non-trival 
process, we consider whether the f i rs t-differenced time 
series have obvious trends. If not we shall consider them 
as close to s ta t ionar i ty . To t e s t whether there are time 
trends in the three variables so as to exclude th is source 
of obvious non-stationarity, a l l the three variables are 
regressed against time trend variables according to the 
following equations: 
X^a^a^ - . . . . . . (2.9) 
X^bQ+^t+^t
2
. • • • • • (2.10) 
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Test resul ts show that a1, b1 and b2 in equations (2.9) 
and (2.10) are not significantly different from zero for 
the series of bir th and death rates (refer to table 2.3,1, 
and 2.3.2 ). For per capita real income, there i s evidence 
of time trend for only six regions ； they are Guangdong, 
-Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Tianjin, Xinjiang and Zhejiang (see table 
2.3.3) . Therefore, the possibi l i ty of a time trend i s 
highly unlikely in most series and we shall t r ea t the f i r s t 
differenced series as close to s ta t ionar i ty for pract ical 
purposes. The three variables af ter f i r s t differencing are 
used for the Granger-causality Test. 
Before performing joint significance t es t s of a l l 
relevant coefficients in equations (2.5) to (2.8), the lag 
orders of the independent variables have to be determined 
f i r s t , i . e . the values of k, m, n, p, q and r in these 
equations have to be estimated. In estimating the 
bivariate and t r iva r ia te models of equations (2.5) to 
(2,8), we want to have a l l the variables used to have the 
same number of lags in every equation so that the error 
terms are not correlated across equations. This simplifies 
the estimation process. In other words, we have k=m and 
p=q in the bivariate models of equations (2.5) and (2.6) 
and k=m=n and p=q=r in the t r ivar ia te models of equations 
(2.7) and (2.8) . As mentioned before, AR order of 
different data series are found out f i r s t in order to 
undergo the Dickey-Fuller Test. All data series seem to 
have AR order from 1 to 3. Therefore, the lag values of 
different variables in the same equation will be assumed as 
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Table 2.2.1 Dickey-Fuller-Test for Crude Birth Rate 
After First Differencing 
Variable: b 
Region Name t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -4.99 -4.70 -3.36 -4.97 -4.53 -3.12 
Anhui -5.25 -2.44 -1.42 -5.18 -2.40 -1.40 
Beijing -5.43 -3.45 -2.52 -5.47 -3.18 -2.19 
»Fuj ian -5.12 -1.85 -1.62 -5.03 -1.76 -1.48 
Gansu -5.46 -4.00 -3.02 -5.40 -3.96 -2.93 
Guangdong -5.78 -3.46 -2.04 -5.76 -3.30 -1.84 
Guangxi -5.02 -3.78 -2.39 -4.97 -3.64 -2.23 
Guizhou -5.12 -4.30 -3.06 -5.06 -4.25 -2.97 
Hebei -5.59 -4.06 -2.97 -5.53 «3.98 -2.89 
Heilongjiang -5.78 -4.13 -2.86 -5.40 -3.64 -2.98 
Henan -4.77 -3.88 -2.96 -4,71 -3.70 -2.67 
Hubei -5.23 -3.54 -1.63 -5.14 -3.45 -1.52 
Hunan -5.81 -3.52 -2,25 -5.75 -3.42 办一2•12 
J iangsu -4.66 -4.31 -3.11 -4.67 -4.37 -3.16 
J iangxi -4.72 -2.66 -2.60 -4.60 -2.52 -2.37 
J i l i n -5.87 -3.70 -2.59 -5.74 -3.45 -2.20 
Liaoning -5.18 -2.19 -1.49 -4.99 -1.97 -1.17 
Nei Mongol -7.31 -2.97 -2.86 -6.95 -2.67 -2.85 
Ningxia -5.65 -3,79 -2.10 -5.59 -3.65 -1.92 
Qinghai -4.52 -4.70 -3.90 -4.45 -4.61 -3.78 
Shaanxi -5.03 -2.90 -2.53 -4.81 -2.65 -2.22 
Shandong r6.05 -3.98 -2.68 -5.95 -3.90 -2.59 
Shanghai -6,56 -3.27 -2.96 -6.54 -2.96 -3.34 
Shanxi -5.52 -3.19 -2.22 -5.45 -3.14 -2-13 
Sichuan -3.93 -4.44 -4.09 -3.89 -4.40 -4.06 
Tianjin -5.86 -2.88 -1.70 -5.68 -2.64 -1.36 
Tibet -4.32 -2,67 -2.19 -4.03 -2.31 -1.80 
Xinjiang -4.68 -3.71 -3.77 -4.65 -3.70 -3.77 
Yunnan -5.65 -3.43 -2.85 -5.57 -3.36 -2.78 
Zhejiang -5.84 -4.03 -2.49 -5.84 -3,85 -2.23 
Note:b=crude birth rate after f i r s t differencing 
t l - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
tml - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming Ar 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
a l l of the above figures indicate stat ionari ty at 5% 
error 
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Table 2.2.2 Dickey-Fuller-Test for Crude Death Rate 
After First Differencing 
Variable: b 
Region Name t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -5.39 -2.45 -0.95 -5.22 -3.55 -0.64 
Anhui -3.71 -0.52 0.99* -3.66 -0.51 0.97* 
Beijing -4.35 -4.13 -3.68 -3.99 -4.15 -2.98 
Fujian -5.78 -3.02 , -1.65 -5.58 -2.71 -1.25 
Gansu -3.74 -1.25 0.33 -3.68 -1.22 0.34* 
Guangdong -5.97 -3.58 -1.60 -5.70 -3.20 -1.05 
Guangxi -5.06 -3.19 -2.00 -5.01 -3.06 -1.84 
Guizhou -4.74 -1.21 0.25 -4.67 -1.17 0.29* 
Hebei -5.00 -1.53 -0.82 -4.85 -1.29 ，0.47 
Heilongj iang-3.49 -1.63 -0.77 -3.26 -1.07 o.03* 
Henan -3.52 -0.39 1.05* ^3.46 -0.36* 1.08* 
Hubei -5.04 -1.55 0.37 -4.91 1.45 0.46* 
Hunan ，5.11 -1.96 -0.29 -4.99 -1.81 -o.07* 
Jiangsu -4.05 -5.19 -3.59 -4 .01 -5.14 r-3.57 
Jiangxi -4.80 -3.21 -0.91 -4.58 -2.62 -0.03* 
J i l i n -3.81 -1.52 -0.88 -3.63 -1.13 -0.35* 
Liaoning -3.60 -1.51 -0.90 -3.53 -1.47 -0.83 
Nei Mongol -8.74 -2.56 -1.77* —8.33 -2.27 -1.47 
Ningxia -5.04 -4.94 -4.07 -5.15 -4.37 -3.17 
Qinghai -4.24 -1.06 0.84 -4.17 -1.03 0.85* 
Shaanxi -4.87 -2.40 -0.76 -4.74 -2.27 -0.61 
Shandong -4•68 -5•14 -3•62 -4•65 -5.02 -3.46 
Shanghai -5.45 -4.02 -5.26 -5.52 -3.88 -5.10 
Shanxi -4.40 -1.65 -0.62 -4.17 -1.18 o.07* 
Sichuan -3.69 -6.21 -3.38 -1.03 -6.11 -3.32 
Tianjin -4.19 -2.30 ，0.95 -3.98 -1.90 -0.43 
Tibet -3.39 -0.04 1.17 -3.29 -0.09* 1.13* 
Xinjiang -5,15 -2.19 -0.56 -4.85 -1.64 0.39* 
Yunnan -4•24 -1.62 0.24 -4.14 -1.53 0.14* 
Zhejiang -5.75 -4.62 -3.16 -5.30 -4.15 -2.18 
Note:d=crude death rate after f i r s t differencing 
t l - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation does not include an 
intercept 
tml - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming Ar 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
a l l figure except those with * indicate stat ionari ty 
at 5% error 
* nonstationary at 5% error 
38 
Table 2.2.3 Dickey-Puller-Test for Income 
After First Differencing 
Variable: b 
Region Name t l t2 t3 tml tm2 tm3 
National -3.73 -4.69 -3.20 -4.29 -4.56 -3.11 
Anhui -5.58 -3.19 -2.94 -5.43 -3.70 -3.16 
Beijing -5.71 -0.32* -0.72* -5.57 -0.41* -3.54 
Fujian -3.80 -4.30 . -2.87 -4.18 -4.91 -3.42 
Gansu -4.15 -4.20 -2.83 -4.31 -4.27 -2.22 
Guangdong -3.71 -3.07 -2.63 -4.56 -3.95 -3.56 
Guangxi -4.14 -3,17 -3.62 -4.72 -3.70 -3.17 
Guizhou -4.26 -3.96 -4.15 -4.46 -4.18 -3.35 
Hebei -3.99 -3.81 —4.45 -4.36 -4.43 —3.91 
Heilongj iang-4.9 8 -2.77 -0.27* -4.78 -2.47 0.27* 
Henan -4.28 -3.90 -3.84 -4.66 -4.30 -3.39 
Hubei -5.09 -3.14 -3.19 -3.27 -3.82 -3.81 
Hunan -4.77 -3.23 -3.72 -5.41 -3.74 -3.32 
J iangsu -3.22 -2.39 -2.01 -4.12 -3.46 ^2.98 
Jiangxi -5.12 -2.83 -3.20 -5.93 -3.49 -3.96 
J i l i n -4.79 -4.38 -3.50 -5.19 -3,73 -1.97 
Liaoning -4.74 -4.07 -3.57 -4.91 -4.36 -2.66 
Nei Mongol -5.74 -3.59 -1.84 -5.61 -3.17 一 1 . 1 8 
Ningxia -5.31 -3.90 -2.93 -4.62 -2.55 -1:26 
Qinghai -4.31 -3.81 -2•75 -5.17 -4.01 -3.07 
Shaanxi -4.76 -4.22 -3.32 -5.16 -4.19 -1.87 
Shandong -5.60 -3.37 -3.23 -4.71 -3.48 -2.05 
Shanghai -4.86 -3.61 -3.15 -5.30 -4.2 6 -2.65 
Shanxi -4.17 —3.85 -4.60 -4.60 -4.40 -3.03 
Sichuan -4.62 -3.89 -3.61 -5.06 -4.42 -2.74 
Tianjin -1.03* -0.95* -0.37* -0.64 -0.60 -4.05 
Tibet N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Xinjiang -4.36 -3.12 -3.48 -4.89 -3.57 -4.00 
Yunnan -4.49 -3.64 -2,68 -5.28 -4.14 -3.03 
Zhejiang -3.10 -2.98 -2.56 -3.84 -3.79 -3.45 
Note: 
P=log per capita income after f i r s t differencing 
七1 一 t一value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation does not include an intercept 
t2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation does not include an intercept 
t3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation does not include an intercept 
tml - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=l and the equation includes an intercept 
tm2 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=2 and the equation includes an intercept 
tm3 - t-value of the estimated coefficient assuming AR 
order=3 and the equation includes an intercept 
All figure except those with * indicate stat ionari ty 
at 5% error 
* non-stationary at 5% error 
N.A. not applicable due to lacking in data 
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Table 2.3.1 Test For Time Trend For Birth Rate After 
First Differencing 
Dependent Variable: B 
Equation: 1 2 
~ Coefficient: a1 b1 b2 
National 0.014 一 0 . 4 3 8 0.457 
An^ui -0.490 -0.566 0.458 
Beijing 0.078 -0.827 0.877 
Fujian -0.351 -0.469 0.393 
Gansu -0.336 -0.472 0.400 
Guangdong 0,037 0.026 -0.017 
Guangxi -0.390 0.308 0.421 
Guizhou -0.737 -0.500 (H325 
H e b e
i -0.110 -0.537 0.527 
Heilongjiang 0.454 -0.267 0.395 
Henan -0.022 -0.020 0.015 
H u b e i




 0.191 -0.291 0.351 
Jiangsu 0.059 -0.712 0.752 
Jiangxi -0.352 -0.514 0.439 
J+lin -0.505 -1.472 1.387 
Liaoning 0.478 0.133 -0.013 
Nei Mongol 1.166 1.366 -1.103 
Ningxia -0.335 -0.073 -0.012 
Qinghai 0.185 0.459 -0.426 
Shaanxi -0.039 -0.130 0.124 
Shandong -0.439 -0.669 0.577 
Shanghai -0.202 一1.709 1.713 
Shanxi -0.833 -1.670 1.503 
Sichuan -0.400 -0.355 0.262 
Tianjin 0.318 -0.633 0.739 
-1.394 -0.664 0.321 
Xinjiang -0.950 -0.763 0.540 
Yunnan -0.364 -0.314 0.230 
Zhejiang -0.314 -0.827 0.773 
Note: T=Time 
B=Birth af ter f i r s t differencing 
equation 1: B=aQ+a t^ 
equation 2: B=bQ+b^t+b2t
Z 
reported figures are the t-value of the 
estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables 
* significant at 5% 
40 
Table 2.3.2 Test For Time Trend For Death Rate After 
First Differencing 
Dependent Variable； D 
Equation: X' 2' 
Coefficient: a- b- b, 
I 1 2 
National 0.645 0.346 -0.190 
Anhui -0.115 -0.256 0.235 
Beijing 1.177 1.198 -0.927 
Fujian 0.710 0.386 -0.214 
Gansu -0.152 -0.281 0.251 
Guangdong 0,747 0.461 -0.281 
Guangxi 0.188 -0.219 0 ‘’ 276 
Guizhou -0.090 -0.359 0.348 
Hebei 0.101 -0.192 0.225 
Heilongjiang 0.379 -0.221 0.328 
Henan 0.013 -0.157 0.165 
Hubei 0.496 0.506 -0.394 
Hunan 0.370 0.104 -0.011 
J iangsu -0.200 -0.639 0.608 
Jiangxi 0.494 0.088 0.038 
J
i l i n 0.334 0.115 -0.031 
Liaoning 0.013 -0,427 0.446 
Nei Mongol 1.733 2.046 -1.645 
Ningxia 0.881 0.595 -0.385 
Qinghai 0.003 -0.174 0.181 
Shaanxi -0.332 -0.361 0.287 
Shandong -0.233 -0.648 0.609 
Shanghai -0,393 -0.069 0.174 
Shanxi 0.245 -0.397 0.475 
Sichuan -0^395 -0.673 0.592 
Tianjin 0.744 0.306 -0.122 
Tibet -0.941 -0.940 0.724 
Xinjiang -0.689 0.396 -0.229 
Yunnan 0.192 0.030 0.019 
Zhejiang 1.519 0.390 -0.007 
Note: T=Time 
D=Death af ter f i r s t differencing 
equation 1' 1 D=a0+a2t 
equation 2": D ^ + W
2 
reported figures are the t-value of the 
estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables 
* significant at 5% 
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Table 2.3.3 Test For Time Trend For Income After First 
Differencing 
Dependent Variable: p 
Equation: 1" 2" 
Coefficient: a1 , b-, b2 
National 0.894 -0.725 0.987 
Anhui 1.397 -0.417 0.741 
Beijing -0.634 -0.645 0.501 
Fujian 0.863 -1.479 1,765 
Gansu 0.503 -0.056 0.190 
Guangdong 0.884 -2.281* 2.613* 
Guangxi 0.719 0.408 0.611 
Guizhou 0.519 -1.347 1.534 
H e b e i
 0.374 -0.921 14-052 
Heilongjiang 0.457 -0.144 0.268 
H e n
an 0.211 -1.258 1.358 
H u b e
i 0.912 -0.333 0.584 
Hunan -0.148 -1.559 1.572 
Jiangsu 2.915* 0.364 0.386 




 0.998 -0.216 0.485 
Liaoning 0,103 -0.574 0.620 
Nei Mongol 0.645 -0.734 0.930 
Ningxia 0.491 -0,884 1.044 
Qinghai -0.449 -1:385 1.313 
Shaanxi 0.105 -0.758 0.812 
Shandong 0.151 -1.286 1.371 
Shanghai 0.157 -0.308 0.360 
Shanxi -0.001 -1.547 1.600 
Sichuan 0.688 -0.962 1.179 
Tianjin -1.324 -2.143* 1.855 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Xin〕iang 0.135 -2.531* 2.657* 
Yun〒an 0.451 -1.727 1.910 
Zhej iang 1.155 -1.700 2 .077* 
Note: T=Time 





reported figures are the t一value of the 
estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables 
* significant at 5% 
N.A. not applicable due to lacking in data 
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2 and 3 respectively, i . e . , for the same equation e .g . , 
equation (2.5), k and m are assumed to be 1 in one t e s t 
equation, to be 2 in another t e s t equation and to be 3 in 
the next another t e s t equation. Results for these three 
equations are l i s t ed and compared. 
2•6 Empirical Results 
The t e s t resul t s for the national data wil l be 
presented f i r s t followed by the resu l t s for the regional 
data. 
Results For National Data 
(1) The causal relationship between bi r th and bir th f 
Bivariate Case 
For the t e s t s using national data, table 2.4 indicates 
that the F—statistics for a l l CjS for the three sets of t e s t 
equation are s ignif icant at 0.1%. This f u l f i l l s the 
defination of causality and i t can be said that there i s 
strong causal e f fec t from death to b i r th . However, table 
2.5 shows that b i r th has no effect on death since the F— 
s t a t i s t i c s for a l l g.s for the three sets of t e s t equations 
are not s ignif icant ly different from zero. Thus bir th does 
not cause death. 
For the t e s t s using regional data, F—sta七istics for 
a l l GjS are s ignif icant ly different from zero for 25 out of 
29 regions, providing strong evidence to support that death 
causes bi r th (refer to table 2.6). On the other hand, 
table 2.7 shows that the F - s t a t i s t i c s for a l l g.s are 
s ignif icant for 16 out of 29 regions, giving a weak 
evidence to support that bir th causes death• 
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Table 2. 4 The Effect of Death and Income On Birth 
(for national data) 
Bivariate Case: 
k m 
Equation:Bt=a+y^  c j D t - j + e i t 
5=1 J=1 
lags F-s ta t is t ics
a 
k m 
1 1 F(l,36) = 28.9463 *** 
2 2 F(2,33) = 27.9653 *** 
3 3 F(3,30) = 20.7996 *** 
Note:
 a
 The F-s ta t i s t ics are used to t e s t the^null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
the Dt”"s are jointly equal to zero. 
*** significant at 0.1%. 
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Trivariate Case: 
k m n 
E q u a t i o n ： d j Y t - j + e l t 
J=1 J=1 
F-s ta t i s t i cs 
k m r 
1 1 1 F
b
 = 15.5861 *** 
F^  == 13.1759 *** 
2 2 2 F = 12.0407 *** 
= 2.0365 
3 3 3 F = 8.3002 *** 
F
C
 = 1.4474 
Note:
 b
 The F-s ta t i s t ics are used to t e s t the null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
c D t..
#
s are jointly equal to zero. 
The F-s ta t i s t ics are used to t e s t the null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
Yt-J"s are jointly equal to zero. 
*** significant at 0.1%. 
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
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Table 2 • 5 The Effect of Birth and Income On Death 
(for national data) 
Bivariate Case: 
P Q 
Equation: D f a + ^ ^ g j B t ^ ^ ^ h j D w + e i t 
lags F-s ta t is t ics
a 
P q 
1 1 F(l,36) = 0.0108 
2 2 F(2,33) = 1.5060 
3 3 F(3,30) = 0.8504 
Note:
 a
 The F-s ta t is t ics are used to t e s t the null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
the B^j's are jointly equal to zero. 
*** significant at 0.01%. 
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Trivariate Cases 
P q r 
E q u a t i o n : h j D t - j + J 2 ^ t - j ^ , 
J=1 J=1 P i 
F-s ta t i s t ics 
P q r 
1 1 1 F
b
 = 0.0766 
F: = 4.6126 ** 
2 2 2 F = 0.1972 
= 1.5009 
3 3 3 F = 0.3512 
F
C
 = 0.9278 
Note: The F-s ta t is t ics are used to t e s t the null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
c B t.j/s are jointly equal to zero. 
The F-s ta t is t ics are used to t e s t the null 
hypothesis that a l l the coefficients of 
Yt>>J"s are jointly equal to zero. 
*** significant at 0.1%. 
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
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Table 2•6 The Effect of Death and Income On Birth 
(for regional data) 
Equation (2.5) Equation (2.7) 
BIRTH Bivariate Case Trivariate Case 
D-^B EH-B Y—B 
3c = m k = m = n 
REGION 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
NATIONAL X X X X X X X 
ANHUI X X X X X X 
BEIJING x X X X 
FUJIAN X X X X X X 
GANSU X X X X X X X ^ 
GUANGDONG X X X X X X X X X 
GUANGXI X X X X X X X X X 
GUIZHOU X X X X X X X X 
HEBEI X X X X X X X X 
HEILONGJIANG x X 
HENAN X X X x X 
HUBEI X X X X X X X 
HUNAN X X X X X X X 
JIANGSU X X 
JIANGXI X X X X X X X X X 
JILIN X X X 
LIAONING x x X X 
NEI MONGOL X X 
NINGXIA X X X X X X 
QINGHAI X X X X X X 
SHAANXI X X X X X X X X X 
SHANDONG X X X X X X 
SHANGHAI X X X 
SHANXI X X X X X X X X 
SICHUAN X X X X X X 
TIANJIN x X X 
TIBET X NA NA NA NA NA NA 
XINJIANG X X X X 
YUNNAN X X X X X X 
ZHEJIANG X X X X X X X 
Note: X - causality exists (the relevant joint t e s t 
i s significant at 5% ‘ 
blank - causality does not exist 
NA - not applicable due to lack of data 
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Table 2.7 The Effect of Birth and Income On Death 
(for regional data) 
Equation (2.6) Equation (2.8) 
DEATH Bivariate Case Trivariate Case 
B->D B—D Y—D 
P = q P = q = r 
REGION 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
NATIONAL x 
ANHUI 
BEIJING X x 
FUJIAN X X X X X 
GANSU X X x -
GUANGDONG X X X 
GUANGXI X X x 
GUIZHOU 
HEBEI X X X 
HEILONGJIANG X X X X X X 
HENAN x 
HUBEI X x X 
HUNAN x 
JIANGSU X X 
JIANGXI 
JILIN X X X X X 
LIAONING x X X X X X 
NEI MONGOL X X X X X 
NINGXIA ‘ ^ 
QINGHAI x x 
SHAANXI X x 
SHANDONG X X X X X X X 
SHANGHAI X x X 一 
SHANXI X X X X ^ 
SICHUAN 
TIANJIN x 
T I B E T
 X NA NA NA NA NA NA 
XINJIANG X x X 
YUNNAN 
ZHEJIANG X X X 
Note: X - causality exists (the relevant joint t e s t 
i s significant at 5%) 
blank - causality does not exist 
NA - not applicable due to lack of data 
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Summing the resul ts from the national data and 
regional data, under the bivariate case, death has a strong 
causa} effect on bir th while bir th has only a weak causal 
effect on death. 
Trivariate Case 
一 F o r the resul ts using the national data, table 2.4 
indicates that death causes bir th in the presence of income 
as the joint t e s t s for a l l CjS for the three sets of t e s t 
equations are also significant at 0.1%. On the other hand 
birth does not cause death in the presence of Income as the 
joint t e s t s for a l l gjS for the three sets of t e s t equations 
are not significant (table 2.5). These resul ts are the 
same as that obtained for the bivariate case. 
For the resul ts using regional data, table 2.6 
indicates that the F—statistics for a l l CjS are 
significantly different from zero for 23 out of 28 regions, 
showing strong evidence of causality from death to bir th in 
the presence of income. Table 2.7 shows that the F-
s t a t i s t i c s for a l l g.s are significantly different from zero 
for 12 out of 28 regions, indicating weak support for the 
causality from bir th to death in the presence of income. 
Summing the resul ts from the national data and 
regional data, i t i s found that death has a strong causal 
effect on bir th while bir th has a weak causal effect on 
death. 
General Conclusion 
The resul ts of the bivariate and t r iva r ia te cases 
consistently show that death has a strong causal effect on 
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birth while bir th has a very weak effect 011 death. 
Therefore, the causal relation between birth and death i s 
likely to be one-sided from death to bir th rather than 
bidirectional. 
(2) The role of income change in the causal relationship 
between bir th and death. 
From the resul ts of the above section, i t i s found 
that the causal relationship between bir th and death i s 七he 
same with or without the presence of income. in the 
bivariate cases, i . e . equations (2,5) and (2.6)：;, the 
results reveal that death causes bir th while bir th i s 
unlikely to cause death. In the t r iva r ia te cases, with 七he 
presence of income, these resul ts remain unchanged. 
Therefore, i t i s concluded 七ha七 income does not change the 
causal pattern between birth and death. 
(3) Other findings: the causal relationship from income 
to bir th and to death, respectively. 





)v we can find out the causal effect from income to 
birth with the presence of death with equation (2.7) and 
七he causal effect from income to death with the presence of 
bir th with equation (2,8). 
The causal relationship of income to birth 
From the t r iva r ia te model, t e s t resul ts of equation 
(2,7) from the national data indicate that there i s 
moderate causal effect from income to bir th as 七he joint 
t e s t for a l l dj 's i s significant at 0.1% for 七he case of 
k=m=n=l (table 2.4) . In table 2 . 6 , t e s t resul ts from the 
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regional data show that causality from income to birth 
exists in 19 out of 28 regions, indicating a modeirate 
causal effect from income to birth. 
The causal relationship of income to death 
On the other hand, in table 2 . 5 , t es t results of the 
—trivariate models of equation (2.8) from the national data 
show that income causes death at 5% for the case of p=q=r=l 
only, showing a weak causal effect from income to death. 
As shown in table 2 , 7 , causality from income to death 
exists in 18 out of 28 regions, indicating a mqderate 
causal effect from income to death. In general, there is 
a moderate causal effect from income to death. 
In short, income causes both birth and death. 
Table 2.8 
Degree of the causal effects of bivariate and 
t r ivar ia te cases for different dependant variables 
Dependant Bivariate Case Trivariate Case 
variable 
Birth (B) EH-B ekb Y—B 
strong strong strong 
Death (D) B—D B—D Y—D 
— _ — weak moderate 
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2•6 Summary 
Table 2.8 summarizes the degree of the causal e f fec ts 
of bivariate and t r iva r i a t e cases for di f ferent dependant 
variables. From the above 七 a b l e , the following are found 
by the Granger-causality t e s t s : 
—1. Death causes bi r th regardless of whether income i s 
present or not. 
2
• Birth i s less l ikely to cause death regardless of 
whether income i s present or not. 
3. Income causes bir th and death respectively. 
During the past 40 years in China, evidence shows that 
death causes b i r th and bir th does not cause death. 
Therefore, i t can be concluded that decline in death ra te 
triggered a subsequent decline in bi r th ra te . And the 
claim that China has completed i t s demographic t rans i t ion 
i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y supported. Besides, death can be deemed 
as an exogenous variables in explaining b i r th . 
The causal relationship from bir th to death can be 
explained by the Malthusian Theory. In the Malthusian 
Theory, a r i se in real wages reduces the average age of 
marriage and increases high risk b i r t h s / 七hus increasing 
mortality. On the other hand, more bir ths may imply less 
available resources for human investment in education and 
in health for each bir th; th i s may in turn increase 
mortality. 
Moreover, income does not cause a change in the causal 
relationship between bir th and death. 
Furthermore, income causes bi r th and death. Income 
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can cause bir th through the income effect- Besides,七he 
level of income can influence the level of human capi ta l , 
e.g. -the amount of education and health capital people 
invest in themselves and thei r children, thereby affecting 
the death ra te . 
: 2 . 7 Problem of the t e s t s 
During the 40 years, China experienced a lot of 
ins t i tu t ional change and new policies, e.g. the Great Leap 
Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the Economic Reform and 
the One-Child-Policy in the 1980's. These change^; might 
cause s tructural changes to 七he causal relationships among 
bir th, death and income• Therefore f to run a causality 
t e s t on China during the period of 1949-1988 may not be 
appropriate. In order to make sure that the empirical 
resul ts of the above section are robust and e f f i c i en t , 
t e s t s on s tructural sh i f t s in the causal relationships 
among bi r th , death and income is necessary. In practice, 
i t i s not r e a l i s t i c to t e s t whethei: a s t ructural sh i f t 
occured under a l l ins t i tu t ional and policy changes. In 
par t icular , we want to t e s t whether there was a s t ructural 
sh i f t under the economic reform which was launched in 1978 
because th i s reform involved a signif icant change in the 
environment affecting people's behaviour and the effects on 
bir th , death and income could be substantial . 
The hypothesis that there are s t ructural sh i f t s in 
the causal relationships among bir th , death and income 
(refer to equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8)) a f t e r 
the implementation of the economic reform can be examined 
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by F-s t a t i s t i c s , 
F _ (eie^-e fe) / k 
〜 e'e/ (n-2k) 
where e《e* i s the res t r ic ted sum of square, 
e 'e i s the unrestricted sum of square, 
q i s the number of res t r ic t ions , 
n i s the number of observations, and 
k Is the number of explanatory variables 
including the intercept. 
The unrestricted sum of squares are obtained from the 
regressions in the l as t section of th i s chapter, while the 
res七ric七ed sum of squares can be obtained by re-running 七he 
regression for equations (5) to (8) with the same 
procedures but using a shorter data ser ies from 1978 
onwards in which years the economic reform was executed. 
I t i s found that almost a l l the F-sta七istics are quite 
small and are insignif icantly di f ferent from zero at 5% 
error.
1 5
 Therefore, i t can be concluded that the economic 
reform did not induce a structural sh i f t to the process of 
demographic t rans i t ion . 
Hence, our empirical resul t s of 七 he causal 
relationship among bir th , death and income based on the 
data of 1949-88 in China i s not hampered by s t ructural 
sh i f t . 
11 
the t e s t resul t s are not reported here for simplicity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FERTILITY CHANGE IN THE REFORM PERIOD 1979-1987 
During the la te 1970s, China underwent a dras t ic 
ins t i tu t iona l reform and policy change. In 1978, china 
started i t s economic reform comprising agricul七ural reform 
in the rural areas and industrial reform in the urban 
areas. In 1979, in order to achieve a more desirable 
population growth ra te , the government introduced a new 
bir th policy, the one-child-policy. This policy allowed 
each couple to have one child only. In the early stage the 
p o l i c y was quite relaxed. After several years, i t became 
more coercive. 
In th i s chapter, I want to explore how the 
ins t i tu t iona l change and the policy change, as well as 
other economic factors affect f e r t i l i t y behaviour in the 
reform period 1979-1987. The method employed in t h i s 
chapter i s the regression analysis using pooled time-series 
and cross-sectional data. Before regression analysis, a 
brief review of the economic reform i s presented f i r s t . 
3.1 The Economic Reform 
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China in 1949, China adopted the communist system; but the 
economic development of the country was undesirably slow. 
People's living standard was not upgraded in spite of the 
admirable ideal of communism. 工n viewing the defects of 
the system, China's leaders decided to reform 七he economic 
system• This was not done unt i l Mao Zedong who advocated 
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the communist system and held the ultimate power of China's 
leadership died in 1976. The new leadership under Deng 
Xiao Peng took economic development as the primary goal and 
introduced economic reform in 1978. 
The reform was divided into two parts: agricultural 
v reform in the rural areas and industrial reform in the 
urban areas. The rural reform came f i r s t . The objective 
was to increase material incentive for peasants, thus 
increasing the production level. The firs七 step was to 
free up 七he free markets, allowing peasants to 七rad实 goods 
exceeding the quota that had to be submitted to the 
government. The second stage was 七o transform the 
t radi t ional collective agricultural system irrto 七 he 
responsibility system. This was undertaken in 1979 and 
greatly improved peasants' incentive to work harder and 
better ; and resulted in higher productivity (Perkins 1988). 
Reform in the urban areas came in 1981. The objective 
was to improve the industrial production. Firs t ly , marJcets 
for inputs and outputs like s teel , machinery, raw materials 
and some consumer products were created so that resources 
could be allocated by the market force. Previously, inputs 
and outputs were allocated by the administration, result ing 
in misallocation. The second step was to offer incentive 
to factory managers so that they could perform and respond 
to prof i t incentives. Increases in the number of private— 
owned and collective-owned enterprises led to more 
competition with the state-owned enterprises, thus 
improving the quality of goods that were produced. other 
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policies like opening the economy to trade with foreign 
countries were also executed. The aims were to stimulate 
local、production, to earn foreign curriencies and to import 
technology. 
Table 3.1 
Growth Rate of National 
Income in China 
Growth Rate of 
National Income 





Source: Dwlght Heald Perkins, "Reforming 
China's Economic System", Journal 
of Economic Literature r June 1988, 
p. 628. 
The remarkable performance of the economic reform was 
recognized locally and in foreign countries. This 
performance was reflected in the growth rate of national 
income in China. As shown in table 3.1, the growth rate of 
national income during the years of 1953—1957 was 6.61 
percent. I t f e l l to 2.09 percent in 七he period of 1957— 
1965. In the nine years following the death of Mao Zedong, 
the growth rate accerelated to 8.78 percent per year, such 
a high growth rate was partly due to an increase in capital 
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and labour. However, productivity increase due to economic 
reform was also substantial (Lin 1989). 
3,2 Effects Of The Economic Reform and Other Economic 
Factors On Fe r t i l i t y 
In order to find out the effect of the ins t i tu t ional 
change, as well as that of other economic factors, the 
following equation will be estimated: 
FR=PNI+NTP+EI+ T+T 2 +LS+LC+PMAD1 +PMAD2+e. . . . (3.1) 
Where FR = f e r t i l i t y rate 
PNI = per capita income 
NTP = non-agricultural population/total 
population 
EI = index of economic reform 
T = time 
LS = share of labour working in s ta te 
enterprise 
LC = share of labour working in collective 
enterprise 
PMAD1 = provincial dummy ( i . e . for provinces, 
th i s equals to 1, and for 
municipalities and autonomous 
regions, th is equal to 0) 
PMAD2 = municipal dummy ( i . e . for 
municipalities, th i s equals to 1, and 
for provinces and autonomous regions, 
th i s equal to 0) 
e = error term 
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Income is a well-known factor that influences 
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f e r t i l i t y . In economic theory, people's demand for 
children is constrained by their income. They choose 七he 
optimal number of children they want according to thei r 
preference and thei r income. Therefore, income affects 
f e r t i l i t y level through the income effect . The income 
effect i s positive as children i s usually deemed as a 
normal good. However, in our analysis, in absence of 
women's wage rate , income effect may imply a negative sign 
because of i t s high correlation with wife 's 身;market 
opportunities. Thus income in our analsis not only 
captures the income effect but also the price ef fec t . 
Hence i t s effect on f e r t i l i t y can only be determined 
empirically. 
The proportion of agricultural population influences 
f e r t i l i t y as there exists an essential difference between 
the demand for children of the agricultural population and 
the non-agricultural population. To the agriculatural 
population, children's value to parents comes from both 
consumption and production because children in rural areas 
ususally help thei r parents in agricultural work. Demand 
for children in th i s case will be thus higher than demand 
for children in the case where children are only for 
consumption mainly (Wong Yue-chim 1987, 1990). The l a t t e r 
case usually happens in non-agricultural population as the 
productive use of children is less direct and less 
11 
for detai ls , see Becker (I960, 1973), DeTray (1973), 
Willis (1973). 
58 
emphasized because in urban areas, people are mainly 
employees,七heir children can hardly help them in 七 h e i r 
work.、 Therefore, i f the agricultural population share 
increases, i t i s l ikely that the f e r t i l i t y ra te increases. 
On the contrary, i f the share of non-agricultural 
population increases, f e r t i l i t y ra te decreases. 
Ins t i tu t ional change may have an ef fec t on f e r t i l i t y , 
because they may influence people's preference and income. 
The ins t i tu t ional change we want to discuss here i s the 
economic reform. There are two aspects of the reform: 
agricultural reform in rural areas and industr ia l reform in 
urban areas. In urban areas, industr ial reform offers more 
opportunities for people to work harder because now wage 
ra 七 es are more l ikely to be linked with work e f fo r t . 
People's wage ra tes increase generally as the i r marginal 
produc七 of labour increase. Therefore, time cost for 
bearing children increases. Although increase in wage ra te 
may bring about posit ive income effect on child-bearing, i t 
i s believed that t h i s effect will be suppressed by the 
government's one-child-policy. 
In rural areas, the responsibil i ty system enables 
peasants to enhance the i r work e f fo r t . I t i s deemed that 
under th i s system, peasants demand more children to obtain 
more labour to help in the i r agricultural production. As 
mentioned before, the demand for children will be higher 
among the agricul tural population because 七hey have both 
consumption value and production value. This effect leads 
to a higher f e r t i l i t y rate (Wong Yue—chim, 1987, 1990). On 
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the other hand, the price effect caused by a higher wage-
rate and by the one-child-policy i s s t i l l operative in 
rural- areas, thus decreasing the demand for children. 
Therefore, we can hardly conclude that demand for children 
in rural areas must increases a pr ior i . 
There are three types of enterprises in China: s t a te -
owned, collective-owned and private enterprises. The 
l a t t e r two became popular af ter the economic reform in 
1978. The proportion of labourers of these three types of 
enterprises can be deemed as another measurement pf the 
level of economic reform. The fact that more labourers 
work in 七he state-owned enterprises instead of collective-
owned and private enterprises may re f l ec t a lower level of 
reform and vice versa. Therefore, i f the effect of the 
economic reform on f e r t i l i t y is positive, the proportion of 
labourers who work in state-owned enterprises will have a 
negative effect on f e r t i l i t y and vice versa. 
On the other hand, higer proportion of labourers work 
in the collective-owned enterprises may ref lec t a higher 
level of reform. And if the effect of the economic reform 
on f e r t i l i t y i s positive, the proportion of labourers who 
work in collective-owned enterprises will have a positive 
effect on f e r t i l i t y and vice versa. 
Here, we use two sets of measures for the economic 
reform. They are EI, LS and LC. In our study/ we adopt an 
index developed by Yang, Wang and Wills (1991) for 七he 
variable EI. This index is an indicator of efficiency in 
specifying and enforcing property r ights in rural china. 
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Although almost 70% of China'a population are agricul tural 
population and can be deemed as a proxy for the economic 
reform, th i s variable may not completely capture the ef fec t 
of economic reform. In order to resolve t h i s shortcoming, 
> “‘ -
we use LS and LC to measure the effect of change in 
proportion of ownership of enterprises on f e r t i l i t y . This 
can enhance our t e s t resu l t s . 
In order to find out whether there are inherent 
differences in f e r t i l i t y rate among provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions, dummy variables are 
created. They are PMAD1 and PMAD2. The former represents 
province and the l a t t e r represents municipality. 
Time i s included as an explanatory variable as I want 
to investigate over time, how the f e r t i l i t y ra te changes, 
holding other mentioned variables constant,七his may shed 
l ight on whether the one—child—policy i s ef fect ive . 
Due to data insufficiency and assuming that the 
f e r t i l i t y ra te bears a close positive relationship with the 
bi r th ra te , the l a t t e r i s used to measure the f e r t i l i t y 
ra七e, hence, equation (3.1) becomes: 
BR=PNI+NTP+EI+ T+ T 2 +LS+LC+PMAD1+PMAD2+e. . . . (3.2) 
3.3 Data Specification 
All data are annual data of 29 administrative regions 
in China. As our aim i s to analyse the effect of 
ins t i tu t iona l change on f e r t i l i t y together with other 
economic factors, we use data series that begins in 1979 
< 
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and ends in 1987 in which period the economic reform was 
being implemented. 
、The crude bi r th rate i s used. Data for per capita 
income are in real term (1952 as the base year)• We use 
per capita income instead of national income because per 
capita income more appropriately decribes the level of 
people's disposable income. NTP i s the fraction of non-
agricultural population in to ta l population. LS and LC are 
the fractions of workers in state—owned enterprises and in 
collec七ive—owned enterprises in the to t a l laboui：, force 
respectively. For the index of economic reform, figures 
estimated by Yang, Wang and Wills (1991) are used. This 
index was constructed by grouping di f ferent relevant 
subindexes together so as to keep the arbi t rar iness in 
quantifying the economic reform as small as possible. As 
the d^ta they compile are national data, not regional data, 
I assume that a l l regions bear the same level of reform and 
use the national data as a proxy for a l l regions. That 
means the data ser ies of EI for a l l regions are the same. 
Though th i s assumption may seem to be less r e a l i s t i c , i t 
may not hamper our purpose to measure the effect of 
economic reform on the bir th ra te . 
3.4 S ta t i s t i ca l Specification 
To be speci f ic / our analysis i s based on 七he time 
series data of dif ferent regions, i . e . f pooled cross-
section time series data. Therefore, equation (3.2) should 
be written as: 
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BRit=PNIit+NTP.t+EIit+T+ T 2 +LSit+LC. t+PMADl i+PMAD2i + e i t 
. . . . . . ( 3 . 3 ) ^ " 
The functional form of equation (3.3) i s assumed to be 
additive. However, in order to have a more robust resu l t , 
regressions based on other functional forms: log form and 
semi-log form, wil l also be done for comparison. 
The s t a t i s t i c a l properties of the estimates of 
equation (3.3) are determined by the nature of the 
disturbance in the model, e i t , where i refers to region. 
There are many approach to deal with cross-sectionaX time-
series data, e.g. cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and 
time-wise autoregressive model, cross-sectionally 
correlated and time-wise autoregressive model, and error 
components model. 
One approach to the specification of the behaviour of 
the disturbances when dealing with cross-sectional and 
time-series data i s to combine the assumptions that we 
frequently make about cross-sectional observations with 
those that are usually made when dealing with time 
• 17 
ser ies . For cross—sectional observations, regression 
disturbances for observations on individual units a t a 
point of time are assumed to be mutually independent but 
heteroskedastic. Concerning the time series data, the 
distubances are assumed to be autoregressive. Combining 
these assump七ions, we may adopt the cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model. Recall 
the assumptions of the model as follows: 
Kmenta 1971, pp.509-510. 
63 
2 2 






j t ) =
 0









it (au 七 oregression) 
For dif ferent regions, the behaviour of 七he 
disturbances i s likey to be different , e .g . , in regions 
where most populace are minority races f b i r th ra te tends to 
be higher because they are less subject to the one—child— 
birth-policy. The disturbances of d i f ferent regions may 
be uncorrelated because they are subject to di f ferent 
strengths of policy and different environment changes. The 
e r
^o r term is assumed to be time-wise au七oregressive 
because we consider that we may omit 七 he relevant 
explanatory variable systematically. We confine the 
autoregressive order to be one for convenience. 
With the above assumptions on the error term, 
e f f ic ien t estimates of the parameters for equation ( 3 . 3 ) 
can be obtained by using a variant of generalized leas七 
squares. Each <Si wil l be estimated f i r s t and the estimated 
will be used as the basis for the generalized leas七一 
squares regression of equation (3.3). 
Results for the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and 
time-wise autoregressive model i s reported in table 3.2. 
Also resu l t s for models assuming a white noise process i s 
also l i s t ed in the same table for reference. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
As shown in the column one of table 3.2, NTP, EI, T
2
, 
PMAD1, and LS are signif icant in explaining the bir th ra te 
in d i f ferent regions. 
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The proportion of non-agricultural population (NTP) i s 
found to have a negative relationship with bir th ra te . This 
result i s consistent with our prediction as mentioned early 
in th is chapter. 
The effect of economic reform (EI) on f e r t i l i t y i s 
found to be negative. This reveals that although on the 
one hand peasants may demand more children under the new 
agricultural system in seeking more labourers, the 
increasing cost of bearing children may override the former 
effect . Besides, in urban areas、 couples tend to decrease 
demand for children because of the price effect of 
children. Hence, the overall effect of the economic reform 
may be negative. 
The provincial dummy (PMAD1) i s found signif icantly 
related to the birth rate . 工 七 b e a r s a negative 
relationship with bir th ra te . This in turn, means that 
bir th rate of provinces are lower than autonomous regions. 
This i s understandable because in autonomous regions, the 
populace are mainly minority group like Manchu , Tibetan, 
Mongolian etc. The birth pattern of minority groups are 
quite different from the Hans. There i s a study showing 
that minority groups in general have more children than the 
Hans (Poston and Shu 1987). Besides, they are not subject 
to the res t r ic t ions of the one-child-birth-policy. 
The fraction of workers in stated-owned in the to ta l 
labour force (LS) i s significant in explaining bir th ra te . 
As predicted, when economic reform has a negative effect on 
f e r t i l i t y , i t bears a positive relationship with bir th 
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Table 3.2 Empirical Result for Equation (3.3) 
Dependent Variable: BR 
Cross了sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregr^ssive Model white Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
PN工 0:1330 (Q.261\ 0.2362 (0.608) 
N T P
 -31.9610 卜4.5221 * -31.8679 (-4.199) * 
E I
 ,18.3230 f-3.230) * -38.8799 («3.282) * 
T -0:2436 r-Q.954) 0.5147 (1.006) 
T
2
 0.1148 76,078) * 0.1019 (3.048) * 
P M A D 1
 "2.2511 (-3.223) * -2.6617 (-4.193) * 
P M A D 2
 2:6400_(1.565^ 2.6416 (1.610) 
L S
 18.8630 (3.443) * 18.0522 (2.651) * 
L C
 -7.9639 r - 1 . 161 ) -8.2746 (-1.517) 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.3 Empirical Result for Equation (3.3) In Log form 
Dependent Variable: LogBR 
Cross了sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregressive Model white Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
logPNI 0.0316 ri-618^ 0.0526 (3.016) * 
NT
P -1.8511 f-4,346、 * -1.8008 (-4:330) * 
E I
 -1-570 f-3,5781 * -2.3636 (-3.619) * 
T
 -0.0088 卜0.589) 0.0312 (1.106) 
T
2
 0.0061 5々/270、 * 0.0057 (3.116) * 
P M A D 1
 -0.1251 卜3.396) * -0.1194 (-3.350) * 
PMAD2 0.1447 fl.593、 0.1452 (1.712) 
L S
 0.9165 (2.850) * 0,7796 (2.067) * 
L C
 -0.4560 (-1.185^ -0.3580 (-1.249) 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.4 Empirical Result for 
Equation (3.3) In Semi-Log Form 
Dependent Variable: BR 
Cross了sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregressive Model white Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
L
°gPNI 0.7043 Y1-95QV 0.9692 (3.123) * 
NTP -31.0400 卜4.371) * -29.9346 (-4.043) * 
E I
 "2.0808 (-3.582、 * -40.5758 (-3.489) * 
T
 "2.2253 卜0.861) 0.5035 (1.003) 
T
2
 0.1138 f5.892、 * 0.0991 (3.021) * 
P M A D 1
 "2.4526 (-3.707、 * -2.2737 (-3.583) * 
P M A D 2
 2.1237 fl.400、 2.0087 (1.330) 
L S
 13.9190 ^2.489^ * 11.9840 (1.784) 
L C
 -7.6030 (-1.212) -5.9816 (-1.172) 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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ra te . 
Finally, as indicated by 七he coeff icient of T and T2, 
we find 七 h a t over time the bir th ra te i s increasing a七 an 





) cons七ant. The variables T and T2 repireserrts the 
一 residual ef fec t of omitted variables. This resu l t i s 
amazing because holding the economic reform and other 
economic variables constant, the bir th ra te i s s t i l l r i s ing 
over time. 
This residual time dummy effect may be due jbo the 
change in 七he number of women of child-bearing age. If 七he 
number of women of child-bearing age increased steadily 
over the years of our study, the b i r th ra te wil l tend to 
increase even i f the f e r t i l i t y rate remains cons七ant. In 
o u r
 t e s t s , we used the bir th rate instead of the f e r t i l i t y 
ra te (owing to the lack of suff ic ient data), therefore, our 
model may not have captured the effect from such a change. 
The residual time dummy effect may r e f l ec t such a change. 
However, as indicated by our test result in table 3.2, the 
residual time dummy effect increases a t an increasing ra te 
over time and has a large coeff ic ient . Hence,七he change 
in the number of women of child-bearing age cannot explain 
such a large residual effect because the mentioned 
demographic feature would not suddenly change in a large 
scale in several years in which our study concerns. 
Another possible explanation for the posit ive residual 
effect may be owing to the fact that we have omitted one-
child-policy e f fec t . The residual ef fec t may then capture 
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the effect of the one-child-policy on f e r t i l i t y . 
Therefore, i t may suggest that the one-child-policy has not 
effectively decreased the birth rate over time. 工七 i s 
commonly believed that the birth rate declined in the 1980s 
in China because a l l the measures the government took was 
—-to bid down the f e r t i l i t y rate . The most well-known 
measure i s the one-child-policy which has not been adopted 
in other countries. Since i t s f i r s t announcement/ i t was 
widely praised for i t s sound achievements. Although i t i s 
hard to test , whether th is policy i s effective in lowing 
down the f e r t i l i t y , our results indirectly suggest that the 
one-child-policy may not be as effective as i s commonly 
believed. 
One of the reason for this resul t may be that the 
policy had not been s t r i c t ly enforced, Zeng Yi (1989) 
suggested the policy had been relaxed af ter 1986. On 七he 
other hand, many people probably delayed their f e r t i l i t y 
plans several years af ter the policy was announced in 1979, 
thus leading to a small baby boom in later years. This 
effect may be significant if the policy i t se l f was not 
tightened. 
The above empirical results apply to both the log form 
and the semi-log form of equation (3.3). The resul ts are 
reported in tables 3.3 and 3.4 also. The findings are 
therefore quite robust. 
From the above results , we know that the provinces 
have a lower bir th rates than the autonomous regions. One 
of the explanations i s that minority groups are 
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concentrated mainly in the autonomous regions and tend to 
have a higher f e r t i l i t y rate. Minority groups here means 
the .ethnical groups other than Hans, e.g. Tibetan, Hui, 
Uygur, Salar, Baoan and Kazak. 
In order to prove this claim, we want to tes t the 
hypothesis: the higher the proportion of minority group in 
a region, the higher the birth rate. A new variable, MIN, 
the percentage of minority group in to ta l population in the 
region is included in equation (3.3). The new equation is 
BRit=PNIit+NTPit+EIit+T+ T 2 +LSit+LCit+PMADl i+PMAD2i +MIN.t+ei t 
. . . . . . ( 3 . 4 ) 珊 ^ 1 … 
Because of the lack of a comprehensive data series and 
knowing that there were no large scale migrations of 
minority group in the 1980s, we use 七he data obtained from 
the Population Census in 1982 for the entire time period of 
1979 to 1987, i . e . , this variable MIN is assumed to be 
constant for the period of our analysis. 
Table 3•5 Percentage of Minority Groups for 
different regions in China 
Regions % Regions % 
Anhui 0.50 ~Liaoning 8Tl5 
Bejing 3.50 Nei Mongol 12.92 
Fujian 1.00 Ningxia 31.94 
G a n
su 7.95 Qinghai 39.10 
Guangdong 1.78 Shaanxi 0.46 
Guangxi 38.26 Shandong 0.55 
Guizhou 26.00 Shanghai 0.47 
H e b
e i 1.61 Shanxi 0.25 
Heilongjiang 4.94 Sichuan 3.67 
Henan 1.07 Tianjin 2.12 




 4.08 Xinjiang 59[59 
J iangsu 0.18 Yunnan 31.70 
Jiangxi 0,07 Zhejiang o.42 
J i l i n 8.11 
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Table 3.5 shows the figures of MIN for different 
administrative regions. 
• Test resul ts for equation (3.4) i s showed in 七 a b l e 
3.6. NTP, EI, T2, PMAD2f LS, and MIN are found significant 
in explaining the birth rates in the different regions• 
The signs for the estimated coefficients for NTP, EI, T2, 
PMAD2, and LS are exactly the same as the t e s t resul ts for 
equation (3.3). However, PMADX now becomes insignicant, 
and the sign of the estimated coefficient becomes positive 
whereas in the previous resul t , i t i s significantly 
negative, MIN i s found to be positively related to the 
bir th ra te , therefore, our hypothesis that a higher 
proportion of minority groups in a region leads to a higher 
bir th rate i s supported. 
Besides, in the previous section, we guess 七ha七 
because minority groups are mainly concentrated in 
autonomous regions and tend to have a higher bir th ra te 
than the Hans, autonomous regions tend to have higher bir th 
irate in general. Now as the percentage of minorities i s 
included in our regression ( i .e . equation 3.4), PMAD1 
becomes insignificant in explaining bir th ra te , we may 
conclude that the main difference in the birth rate between 
provinces and autonomous regions l i es in the difference in 
the proportion of minorities in these two administrative 
regions. 
The above empirical results apply also to the other 
two functional forms of equation (3.4) (see tables 3.7 and 
3.8), therefore, the tes t results are robust. 
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Table 3.6 Empirical Result for Equation (3.4) 
Dependent Variable: BR 
Cross-sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregressive Model white Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
p
NI -0.7176 卜1.570) -0.2643 (-0.707) 
NTP -31.4080 卜4.182) * -27.4172 (-3.834) * 
E I
 -23,4850 f-3.735) * -39.6654 (-3.573) * 
T "0-1428 卜0.485) 0.5097 (1.063) 
T2 0 . 1 2 2 6 ( 5 . 1 2 8 ^ * 0 . 1 0 3 5 ( 3 . 3 0 2 ) * 
PMAD1 0.1162 ro.112^ -0.2941 (-0.409) 
PMAD
2 7.8571 ^4.181) * 6.1258 (3.717) * 
L S
 14.6050 r2.Q8n * 11.1867 (1.725) 
L c
 "6.7091 卜1.128) -4.0402 (-0.783) 
M][N
 0.1287 f5.968、* 0.1051 (5.879) * 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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-Table 3.7 Empirical Result for Equation (3.4) 
In Log Form 
Dependent Variable: LogBr 
Cross-sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregressive Model White Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated, 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
LogPNI -0.0039 (-0.180) 0.0225 (1.241) 
NTP -1.6659 卜3*594、* -1.6168 (-4.010 广* 
EI -1,2916 卜3.840) * -2.3679 (-3.760) * 
T -0.0106 (-0.667) 0.0314 (1.156) 
T
2
 0.0068 (5.182) * 0,0585 (3.293) * 
PMAD1 0.0178 (0.327) -0.0263 (-0.652) 
PMAD2 0.3973 f3.743) * 0.2946 (3.328) * 
LS 0.5292 fl.300) 0.5709 (1.557) 
LC -0.1435 卜0.407) -0.1628 (-0.582) 
MIN 0.0055 (4.667) * 0.0047 (4.401) * 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.8 Empirical Result for Equation (3.4) 
In Semi-log Form 
Dependent Variable: Br 
Cross-sectionally Heteroskedastic Model Assuming 
and Time-wise Autoregressive Model White Noise 
Independent Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
LogPNI -0.1194 (-0.281V 0.3 657 (1.145) 
NTP -26.4140 (-3.477V * -26.2396 (-3.69¾) * 
EI -23.8550 (-3.801、 * -40.6636 (-3.667) * 
T -0.1910 r-0.649) 0.5082 (1.061) 
T
2
 0.1222 (5,110) * 0.1013 (3.238) * 
PMAD1 0.0242 (0.024) -0.4041 (-0.569) 
PMAD2 6.5534 (3.632) * 5.0095 (3.213) * 
LS 7.2727 fl.061) 7.7942 (1.207) 
LC -3.3007 (-0.585V -2.0632 (-0.419) 
MIN 0.1127 (4.767) * 0.0942 (5.018) * 
Note: ( ) are t-value of the estimated coefficient. 
* significant at 5%. 
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3.6 Summary 
In th i s chapter, i t i s found that the ins t i tu t ional 
change - the economic reform has a negative effect on 
f e r t i l i t y . Other economic variables, the proportion of 
non-agricultural population, and the proportion of workers 
in stated-owned enterprises are also significant in 
explaining the bir th ra te . 工n addition, there i s some 
indirect evidence to show that the one-child-policy may not 
be as effective as i s commonly believed. Besides, the 
inherent difference in the birth rate between provinces and 
autonomous regions i s due to the proportion of minorities 




In th i s paper, i t i s formally shown that China has 
completed the demographic transit ion during the las t 40 
: y e a r s . 
Besides, i t i s found that the economic reform, as well 
as the fraction of non-agricultural population has a 
negative relationship on the birth ra te . Hence, if the 
economic reform in China keeps on and the economy becomes 
• - ».• * . . * .. , • , '-:. .. ' •矛r 
more industrialized rather than agricultural , the problem 
of population growth may be alleviated. Of course, the 
degree of th is alleviation s t i l l needs a further study. 
Moreover, the one-child-policy seems to be less 
effective as i s commonly believed, therefore, i t may not be 
desirable for the government to wholly rely on th i s policy 
to control the population growth. 
Although the study of China's demography has become 
more popular, there are fewer studies using the economic 
approach. Despite i t s simple methods and the limitations 
due to the data insufficiency, I hope th i s paper can 
generate more dicussions from an economic viewpoint and 
in i t i a te more studies in the future. 
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APPENDIX A： 
GLOSSARY OF SOME DEMOGRAPHIC TERMS
18 
Census. A canvass of a given area, resulting in an 
enumeration of the entire population and the 
compilation of demographic, social and economic 
information pertaining to that population at a 
specified time. 
Crude bir th ra te . The average annual number of bir ths 
during a specified period per thousand persons in the 
mid-period to ta l population. 
Crude death ra te . The average annual number of deaths 
during a specified period per thousand persons in the 
mid-period to ta l population. 
Demographic t ransi t ion. The sh i f t from a t radi t ional 
pattern of relat ively high mortality and f e r t i l i t y to 
a modern pattern of relat ively low mortality and 
f e r t i l i t y . Because the decline in mortality usually 
leads the decline in f e r t i l i t y , there i s an interim 
period of rapid natural population increase during the 
t ransi t ion. 
Demography. The sc ient i f ic study of human populations, 
including their size, composition, distr ibution, 
density, and growth, along with the relationships 
between population processes and other socioeconomic 
characterist ics of the population. 
Fer t i l i ty . Actual reproductive performance of individuals, 
couples, or populations, as measured by the production 
of l ive bir ths . 
General f e r t i l i t y rate . The annual number of bir ths per 
1,000 women of childbearing age. 
Infant mortality rate . A measure of the frequency of 
deaths experienced during a specified period by-
infants between the moment of thei r live bir th and the 
attainment of exact age one. Usually calculated as 
the number of deaths to infants under one year of age 
per thousand live births occurring during the same 
calendar year. 
Population growth rate . The average annual percent change 
in the size of a population, resulting from a surplus 
(or def ic i t ) of births over deaths and the balance of 
migrants entering and leaving the country. 
11 
Source: Banister (1987), pp. 392-395. 
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Total f e r t i l i t y ra te . The average number of children who 
would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if 
she lived through a l l her childbearing years and 
conformed to a l l the age-specific f e r t i l i t y rates of 
a given year. 
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APPENDIX B； SOURCES OF DATA 
NATIONAL DATA 
Almanac of China's Population 1989 
Almanac of China's Population 1990 
China Population Sta t i s t ics Yearbook 1990 
Zhongguo Jihwa Shengyuh Nianjian 1986 
Zhongguo Jihwa Shengyuh Nianjian 1987 
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1989 、 
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1990 
REGIONAL DATA 
ANHUI 二 
Anhui Si Shi Nian, 1989 
BEIJING 
Beijing Shehui J ingj i Tongji Nianjian 1989 
Beijing Nianjian 1990 
JIANGXI 
Fen Jin De Jiangxi 1949-1988 
NEI MONGOL 
Fen Jin De Nei Mongol 1947-1989 
FUJIAN 
Fujian Fen Jin De Si Shi Nian, 1990 
Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1990 
GANSU 
Gansu Tongji Nianjian 1989 
GUANGDONG 
Guangdong Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Guangdong Tongji Nianjian 1990 
GUANGXI 
Guangxi Nianjian 1989 
Guangxi Tongji Nianjian 1989 
GUIZHOU 
Guizhou Tongji Nianjian 1987 
Guizhou Tongji Nianjian 1990 
HEBEI 
Xin Hebei Si Shi Nian 1949-1989 
Hebei J ingj i Tongji Nianjian 1990 
HEILONGJIANG 
Heilongjiang Jingj i Tongji Nianjian 1990 
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HENAN 
Henan Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Henan Jingj i Tongji Nianjian 1990 
HUBEI 
Hubei Tongji Nianjian 1990 
HUNAN 
Hunan Tongji Nianjian 1989 
JIANGSU 
J iangsu Tongji Nianjian 1990 
J iangsu Si Shi Nian 1949-1989 
JIANGXI 
Jiangxi Tongji Nianjian 1990 
JILIN 
J i l i n Shehui J ingj i Tongji Nianjian 1990 : 
LIAONING 
Liaoning J ingj i Tongji Nianjian 1990 
NEI MONGOL 
Nei Mongol Tongji Nianjian 1989 
NINGXIA 
Ningxia Si Shi Nian 1949-1989 
QINGHAI 
Qinghai Tongji Nianjian 1990 
SHAANXI 
Shaanxi Tongji Nianjian 1987 
Shaanxi Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Shaanxi Tongji Nianjian 1990 
SHANGDONG 
Shangdong Tongji Nianjian 1990 
SHANGHAI 
Shanghai Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Shanghai Tongji Nianjian 1989 
SHANXI 
Shanxi Tongji Nianjian 1989 
SICHUAN 
Sichuan Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Sichuan Tongji Nianjian 1990 
TIANJIN 
Tianjin Tongji Nianjian 1988 





Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 1990 
XIZANG 
Xizang( Tibet) Shehui Jingji Tongji Nianjian 1989 
YUNNAN 
Yunnan Tongji Nianjian 1988 
Yunnan Tongji Nianjian 1989 
ZHEJIANG 
Zhejiang Tongji Nianjian 1990 
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